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The nation of Nigeria,

located in sub-Saharan West Africa,

was considered one of the former European colonies possessing the
potentials after its independence in 1960 to develop itself as
both a viable political as well as economic system.

The attri

butes so often identified with such successful developmental ef
forts of nations in the past--abundant human and natural resourdes-
were the positive factors political scientists and economists
considered as being of primary importance if the full potentials
of Nigeria were to be realized.
However, the road towards the economic and political devel
opment of Nigeria has not been an easy one due to several miti
gating factors, including the colonial heritage of that nation,
the prevalence of ethnic divisions within its economic and pol
itical institutions, and the misallocation of resources and pri
orities in the dev�lopmental schemes since independence.

The

height of the ethnic divisions culminated in the attempted seces
sion of the Eastern state in 1965 which was followed by five years
of civil war with the result that although the physical boundar
ies of the nation were preserved, the military felt it necessary
to intervene in the political process with the result that it has
been military men who have d�rected the subsequent development
efforts within Nigeria since 1970.
The concern of this paper is in evaluating the military
regimes of the 1970s within Nigeria as agents of aevelopment,
to try and to determine if in effect economic and political
development has taken place throughout the decade, keeping in

mind the close correlations between the two areas of development
as espoused by several social scientists, most prominently Sey
mour Lipset.

The primary orientation of the paper· is towards

the economic development plans of the 1970s and how effectively
they have been at improving the Nigerian economic system with
an emphasis on economic development as merely opposed to economic
growth.

Thus what data .was studied was that concerned with the

creation of the economic infrastructures considered so essential
as conduits of economic development as well as the other infra
structures such as education, transportation, and communications,
which also serve as promoters of both economic as well as poli
tical development.
The conclusions reached upon researching the economic data
and the implementation of the three economic development programs since Nigerian independence were that while significant
economic development has occurred, particularly during the 1970s,
serious �roblems remain.

The overestimation of petroleum as a

sole financer of the economic development schemes of the nation
initially caused tremendous overspending by the governments, and
agricultural prodµction has steadily declined to the point where
.

'

Nigeria must now import one billion dollars worth of basic foodstuffs
annually, yet only thirty percent of its arable land is presently
under cultivation.

Shortages in highly-skilled manpower prevails

as does a lack of administrative and managerial personnel.

The

transportation infrastructure needs extensive updating and suffers
from a combination of maladies including a lack of capital investments as well as poor management.

It does appear that the military regime which seized power
in a bloodless coup in

1975

was more in tune with the real needs

and capabilities of the Nigerian economic system and the last
five years have seen a more realistic approach towards economic
planning.

Industrialization is taking place and more invest

ments are being steered towards agriculture and education, al
though ·a disproportionate share of the annual budgets are de
voted towards military spending.

Inflation rates have been cut

in half and because of Nigeria's vast oil deposits, the nation
remains in a fairly good position in the international trading
arena.
The political development of the nation also appears to have
taken place with .. the scheduled return to a civilian government
with the election in September,

1979·

While many social scien

tists have adopted a jaundiced view of past promises by military
men to return to the barracks, survey data does indicate that
since

1967

there has been a conscious effort by the military to

incorporate civilians into top-level administrative and decision
making positions, and in fact, military men occupy only the very
top level political positions at the federal level and the govern
orships at the state levels.
·

Whether the transfer to a civilian

government occurs smoothly will probably depend more on the con
tinued prevalence of ethnicity in both economic as well as pol
itical institutions than on any preference by the military to
remain in power.

The potentialities of the Nigerian nation re

main very considerable, but whether true economic and political

-�-

development has occurred in the 1970s, and how effective the mil
itary has been as the agents of those developmental efforts, will
be easier t o evaluate if and when a civilian government has had
its own opportunity to pursue further developmental schemes in
the ensuing years following the September elections.

I.

Introduction:
1

The Orientation of This Study:

•'
.

..

With the impending return to a civilian government in
Nigeria scheduled for September, 19?9, perhaps now is the time
to reflect upon the performance of the interim military govern
ment, which has been responsible for directing the economic de,

velopment of that state during the decade of the 1970s.

Nigeria,

located in sub-Sahaian West Africa, has in the past often-been
viewed by both political scientists and economists as being one
of the former European colonies in Africa which possessed the
chance for a very promising future, particularly when considered its
many potentials.

The characteristics so often associated with

successful economic developmental efforts in the past history
of other count�ies--abundant natural resources, a large population,
access to both inland as well as overseas commercial trading
�outes--all were, and remain, as positi�e factors within the
Nigerian economic developmental capabilities.

However, since

that state's independence in 1960, the road towards economic de
velopment has not been an easy one, and many major obstacles

-�-

have presented themselves, obstacles either not considered at all
by those social scientists concerned with Nigerian economic de
velopment� or even if considered, dismissed by both Western as
well as non-Western planners who have been involved in the post
independence economic development of that nation.
Of cours� the problems involved in the economic development
of Nigeria, and the varrous ramifications surrounding such an
expansive undertaking, are not merely economic in nature, but
due to the particular circumstances and history of this West
African nation, are necessar�ly also cultural and political. Ni-

·

geria, like all of the other former European colonies, faced
acute problems in the immediate post-independence era due to the
effects of the extended period of colonial subjugation, problems
which in the post-colonial era would affect subsequent develop
mental efforts.by various types of regimes in various nations.
What this paper will attempt to do is to evaluate the efforts
unde�taken in the

1970s within Nigeria towards the development of

its economic system; efforts which have taken place under the
auspices of a military government throughout the nine years to be
considered

(1970-1979)• keeping in mind· the various·s�cio-economic

and political factors which have affected this massive undertaking.
In essence then, what this paper represents, is an attempt to
judge one of the newly emerging, and potentially wealthy, nations
of the sub-Saharan African continent.
Thase particular years are being considered because they are
the first ones in which it has really been Nigerians making the key

-J-

economic as well as political decisions regarding the course of
development to pursue.

The immediate years after independence

were ones of neo-colonialism, then the 1965 Civil War disrupted
any attempts at comprehensive long-range economic planning, so it
really has only been during these last nine years that we have
observed the independent nation of Nigeria attempting to over\

come its century of colonial economic suppression and develop and
maintain itself as a viable economic and political system.

With

the return to a civilian government in September of this year,
this period under study represents almost a solid decade of ef
forts upon the part of a military regime to implement policies
which its planners have felt would best promote economic devel
opment.

While no real effective period of Nigerian civilian

rule has in the past been established upon which to compare the
efforts of the military, this evaluation will be useful when i n
the future attempts are made to evaluate the developmental ef
forts pursued by subsequent civilian governments.

2. The Relationship Between Economic and Political Development a
The major concern of political scientists when studying
the-development of nations has often in the past been.confined
within the more familiar area of the specifics of political de
velopment and various authors have come to accept some basic
premises which are considered the guidelines towards promoting
political development.

According to Claude Welch, the process of

political modernization has three major characteristics including

-"f'-

the followings

(1) An increased concentration of power in the hands of
the national government, accompanied·by the weaken
ing of traditional sources of �uthorityJ

(2) The differentiation and specialization of political
institutions and structuresi

(3) The increased popular participation in politics and
a greater identification of individuals with the
political system as a whole.

(Welch,

1971, p. 7).

These criteria put forth by Welch and others are based on
the theory that political development means a movement towards a
form of government considered to be democratic in nature. Seymour
Lipse·t further contends that the most common generalization link
ing political systems to other aspects of a society has been
that democratic forms of government are directly related to cer
tain levels of economic development.

He feels that certain le

vels of affluence are often necessary if a society is to be able
to realize both a mass as well as intelligent participation in
the political proces�es.

(Lipset,

1962, p. 31). Lipset also con

tends that increased levels of personal wealth and education
which accompany economic development also serve democracy by
increasing the lower classes' exposure to cross-pressures which
in turn reduces these class commitments to given ideologies and
make them less receptive to extremist ones.

(Lipset,

1962, p. 50).

Increased wealth also changes the shape of the social stratifica
tion structure from an elongated pyramid with a large lower class
base, to a diamoi\u

s!'1Ci..1Jcj

wl th a growing middle class.

If enough
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wealth is available for general distribution throughout the en
tire society, then acceptance of a political opposition by those
presently in power also becomes more of a reality to both in
dividuals as well as gr oups.
At the same time that individuals were bec oming m ore re
ceptive t o the idea that in fact there were some c orrelations
bet'Neen levels

of

'

economic and p olitical development; there has

also been a growing awareness among these same experts that eco
nomic development (or the lack of it) is also an important deter-·
minant a s to how rapidly and how effectively that political de
velopment can and will take place and that a lag in either the
political or economic spheres can and often does affect the de
velopment of the other.

The concept of political-economy, as

defined by Gutland and Wallerstein, and more specifically concerned with the relationships between the two areas of develop
ment, will be explored in more detail later, but it will suffice
at this time to make clear that increasingly it has become ap
p�rent that political and economic development are two very in
terrelated and indeed interdependent phenomenon, and historically
when·one· studies development, whether in the Western or other
models, one frequently finds that political development within
states accompanies the increased development of those nations'
economic capabilities.
One 0£ the major problems confronting the newly independent
African states in the 1960s was that once independence became a
reality to the masses within individual states, the demands put
forth by those masses more often than.not exceeded the economic

-

o

-

capabilities of the governments to deliver in �erms of the pro
visioning of goods and services.

The reasons behind the new

governments• inabilities to deliver these goods and services
demanded by the newly politicized masses were often not merely
economic in nature, but political as well.
James Scarritt discusses many of the consequences of colon
ial rule in the subsequent attempts at est�blishing viable pol
itical systems after independence in African states.

He finds

that innovative norms were weak outside 'of the economic sphere
due to the emphasis with the colonial bureaucracy on the "spirit
I

.

of the clerk" which had a low tolerance for conflict and virtually
no potential for innovation.

Also the colonial system displayed

a low level of effort at the promoting of political integration
within the colonized regions, even though these regions were us
ually very pluralistic in nature; a pluralism which was a dire�t
effect of the dividing up of the African continent into European
spheres of influence during the Berlin Conference ( 1884-1885)._
Under European colonialism, in fact, there was not only a definite
separating of the colonizers and the indigenous peoples, but also
a d�liberate fostering of regional, ethnic, political, and ed
ucation-based cleavages which were to have very serious ramifi
cations in the immediate post-independence politics of Nigeria
as well as various other African nations.
Scarritt also cites the imposition of various cultures which
were superimposed upon the cultures of the indigenous peoples
including the private enterprise culture of European entrepreneurs,

the Christian culture of the missionaries, and the official, or
at least semi-official, culture of the colonial administration as
another effect of the colonizers which would in turn also influence
the politics of the post-independent states, as various elites
were recruited within each of these cultures, and as traditional
cultures attempted to resist the penetrations of these European
ones.

The high concentration of power within the colonial system

also is listed by Scarritt as an important characteristic of
colonial rule and he found that even under the indirect form of
colonial administration as p�acticed by Great Britain, it was
only purely local decisions which were not made directly by col
onial authorities, and power as exercised by the administrators
..

was done so in a very authoritarian manner by the colonial bur
eaucrats with the result that traditional African political sys
tems were_ frequently modified in

an

authoritarian direction by

incorporating them into the colonial system through the cooptive
processes available.

( Scarritt, 1972, p. 24-26).

Because of the fact that indigenous elites were virtually
excluded from the major decision-making processes during the
period of colonial rule, when independence· was attained in the
.

1960s, the majority of African governments found themselves in_

experienced with the day-to-day problems of administering a na
tion, as welt as lacking the training and experience necessary
for planning comprehensive developmental programs.

Historically,

concentrations of control and the differentiation of political
institutions has preceded the participation of the masses in
politics, and if one observes the political development within

-�-

the Western nations of the world as well as Japan it becomes
apparent that steps to include more and more participants in the
political processes were taken in tandem with increases in the
economic capabilities of each particular system to deliver the
increased demands which naturally accompany increased levels of
participation in a political system (again, reinforcing the
thesis put forth by Lipset).

However, in the post-colonial

states, mass participation was frequently granted by the newly
formed governments immediately in the post-independence period
and a great challenge was th�s presented to those elites con
cerned with economic modernization and development as some of
the demands by the newly politicized masses soon outpaced both
the economic as well as political capabilities of the new re
gimes in power.
3. Judging the Performance of a Political Regimes
The fragmentation of the internal politics of many of the
newly independent states in Africa due to their colonial legacy
led to stagnation in political and economic development and often
threatened to bring about the total collapse of individual nation
state systems.

Christian Potholm dis�usses the various capabil

ities of a political system, capabilities which each particular
syste� must be·ab'l� to realize if it is to remain a viable and
legitimate representative of the populace and if it is to remain
in a position of political power, including the following•

(1) Regulative capacity--the ability of a government
to control the actions of its peoples and to in-
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fluence members' behavior with the amount of regu
lation necessary to regulate each society varying;
(2) Extractive capability--the ability to· tap a nation's
human and natural resources in terms of productivity
collection, and utilization of these resources;
(J) Distributive capability--the ability to reward a
nation's member populace by the allocation of goods,
services, and status;
(4) Rejuven�tive capability--the ability of a system
to reinforce itself, maintain and alter its insti
tutions, structures, and processes, and to replenish
its personnel through the socialization and recruit
ment processes;
(5) Symbolic capability--the images (domestically and
internationally) that the particular governmental
regime projects (which is in essence, a reflection
not only of the regulative, extractive, distribu
tive, and rejuvenative capabilities and their par
ticular interactions, but also of the decision
making process and its goal orientations as well as
the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of
the world community).

(Potholm, 1970, p. 11-26).

The legitimacy, and hence very survival of any particular
political system (survival over an extended period of time), de
pends upon the regime in power and its ability to tap the poten
tials of the particular nation in-terms of human and natural re-
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sources which in turn means that a government's utilization of each
of the capabilities described by Potholm.

This is one set of

criteria which will be used in an examination of the performance
of the military regime in Nigeria during the 1970s, particularly
as those criteria relate to efforts at economic development.

4. The Emergence of Military Regimes as Agents of Developmenta
In the post-colonial era we witnessed time and time again
the failure of governments to fully realize their individual na
tion's potentials and capabilities.in the area of regulative,
extractivet distributive, rejuvenative, and symbolic capacities,
and as internal problems continued to mount, alternative political
solutions begain to be explored and indeed undertaken.

The most

common.alternative utilized, not only in Africa, but also in Latin
America and Asia, was the emergence of the military as a dominant
force in the internal politics of individual nations.

Again it is

P�tholm who has studied the various reasons often given for the
necessity of authoritarian forms of governments which have often
emerged in African political systems and he includes the followinga
(1) The multiplicity of the peoples found within the
boundaries of individual nations and the prevalence
of traditionalism in present relationships and in
stitutions s

(2) The artificial boundaries of the nations and their
particular colonial experi.ences;
(3) The failures of pluralism both in theory and practice
in the immediate post-colonial exneriences 0£ African
nations;

- 1 1-

(4) The continuing foreign interferences in African
politics. (Potholm, 1979, P· 197).
Whether or not one accepts the contentions by various au
thors that authoritarian forms of government are necessary to
handle the .specific problems being encountered by newly inde
pendent nations, the fact remains that the mid-196os witnessed
the emergence of a plethora of mi�itary-dominated governments
throughout the African continent.

The motives· for the various

interventions of the military and subsequent establishments of
military regimes within African political systems has varied and
includes:

(1) A concern by the military with the prevalence of
corruption within the civilian governments a·

(2) The breakdowns in civilian political systems and a
concern on the part of the military with the threat
of a total collapse of the entire system;

(3) Chauvanistic concerns within military factions re
garding their allocation of resources by the civil
ian regimesa
(4) The· need to prevent disciplinary action which a ,
civilian regime had threatened against the military
(the particular case of 1971 �ganda);
(5) Because of military opposition to the prevalent
civilian politi�al ideologya

(�·) nue. to the prevailing internal military rivalriesa
(1). Prevailing ethnic conflicts within . the. military (as
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was so evident in Nigeria in the early 1960s);
(8) The pursuit of societ�l changes (Somalia and Ethi
opia);
(9) Exogenous intrusions and individual reactions by
the military to such actions;
{10) An attempt to arbitrate between conflicting groups
'

. within an individual nation;
{11) Personal power grab� (Dahomey, Uganda, and Togo);
(12) Coups tend to simulate other coups. (Potholm, 1979,
p. 198-202).
5. Past Performances of Military Regimes as Developers:
The emergence of military governments due to any one of
the above reasons or any combination of them, has largely been
due to the fact that traditionally military organizations have
felt that they are above the internal politics which in many
instances in the post-independence states were responsible for
extended periods of political and economic instability.

In the

example of Nigeria in 1965 ethnicity played a major role in the
assumption of political power by the military as did the real
�ear'that the allowing of a secessionist movement would· set a
dangerous precedent, a fear felt by many other African leaders.
In developing countries it is often the military which represents
the largest single group of individuals who have received at
least a primary education (among the enlisted ranks) as well as
a significant number of highly, often Western-educated individuals
(the officer ranks) and it is partially because of these factors
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that many military leaders have felt that their organizations
are the most capable in terms of abilities to tap the human
and natural resources, regain stability, and set the nation on
a successful course of economic development.
The available data from a twenty year survey of military
and nonmilitary regimes seems to support the milit.a�¥'S contention
that in many instances tney are an · organization which is capable
of instituting development policies and programs.

A study con-

(

ducted by McKinlay and Cohan found no indication that military
regimes had a weaker background as concerns economic development
expertise than nonmilitary regimes.

However further information

seems to indicate that military regimes are in a somewhat weaker
positiqn as regards international trade than are nonmilitary .low
inoome regimes and that military regimes do appear to have lower
levels of exports and imports than do low-income nonmilitary ones
in various GNP categories.

As specifically regards the economic

performance of military regimes the findings indicate that cost
of living increases are significantly higher in military regimes,
rates of growth overall in terms of G N P and exports are however,
very similar to nonmilitary regimes.

Further, African military

regimes have weaker background and international trading positions
and do not perform as well as th.e equivalen� nonmilitary govern
ments.

Of course Nigeria, with its crude petroleum reserve�.

finds that it has been able to realize significant growth rates
and at the· present enjoys a favorable position in the world markets.

Another qualifying comment concerning the peculiarities of
the Nigerian military regime of the 1970s which affects some of
the findings of McKinlay and Cohan is the fact that. the seizure
of power by the military in 1995 did not reflect any ideological
deviation on the part of the mil.itary but was purely a move to
prevent the collapse of the nation.

The military since it has

been in power has not pu�sued massive nationalization policies
which have so commonly occurred under other mi�itary regimes,
although the indigenization policies enacted in 1978 did attempt
to ensure Nigerian control of the essential means of production.
The military has also pursued a mixed economy a s its goal for
economic development with only a minimum of the very essential.
-

industries being state-owned (such as petroleum). The major concern of the military regime in Nigeria since political stability
was achieved in 1970 has been a very pragmatic approach towards
economic development with the growth and development of essential
infrastructures and the providing of capital for investments being
the major areas of concentration and direct government involvement.
6. A Framework for an Analysis of Nigerian Economic Developments
.

-

By focusing on the economic development efforts·of the

'

Nigerian military regime during· the period from 1970-1979. this
paper is attempting to evaluate the military as an agent of de
velopment.

Because of the interrelationships and interdependences

between economic and political development, the efforts of the
military in the promotion of economic development are closely re
lated to the continuing process of political development which
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will culminate in the SGptember return to a civilian form of
a democratic government.

Because of traditions of democratic

forms of decision making at the communal and tribal level through
out the history of Nigeria and the early participation of the
masses in the 1960s, the military has never pretended to be more
than a temporary custodian of the nation, serving only until
stability could be regained and a peaceful transiticn to a.civ
ilian government would be feasible.

Fotholm discusses the var-'

ious models of military governments which emerged during the
l9
. 60s, including praetorian ones (in which rule was both hier
archical an� authoritarian but in which the core of authority was
weakened by acute societal and military factionalism), personal
dictatorships (in which the rule was highly authoritarian and
personal such as was witnessed in Uganda under Amin), managerial
brokerage systems (in which case the military is in power merely
to arbitrate disputes among sectors of society1 (the military has
relatiYely high status and firm lines divide the military and
civilian sectors)s and bureaucratic and holding systems (in ·
which power assumptions are from the onset only temporary in
nature). (Potholm, 1979, p. 204).
Using the information provided by Potholm it is evident from
the Nigerian example that the motives behind the military take
over of political power in Nigeria was a combination of a desire
to prevent the collapse of the nation (the secession of Biafra)
as well as the prevailing ethnic conflicts found both within
the Nigerian society as well

as

within the �ilitary. It is also
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evident that the military never pretended to be more than a bur
eaucratic holding system because of its initial declarations con
cerning an eventual return to civilian rule.

While many political

scientists have a jaundiced view concerning such pro�ises made by
various military regimes concerning a return to a civilian govern
ment once "stability" has been achieved, information collected by
Henry Bienen seems to indicate that indeed the Nigerian military
regime has never pretended to be more than a temporary stabilizing
force within the political system.

In Bienen's survey he found

that the military has created or recrea.ted civilian or mixed
civilian-military institutions for the purpose of gathering, pro
cessing, and disseminating information as well as for the purpose
of major decision making.

While the military has failed itself

to recruit grass-roots support, it has relied on civilian poli
ticians to establish contacts, especially in the rural areas
(an indication that the military is not concerned with maintain
ing any more political support than is necessary for the imple
mentation of development schemes). Bienen further found that the
majority of the military presence in political and administra
tive capacities was at the Supreme Military Council and.the Fed
eral Executive Council, but not in state cabinets.

Military

officers, aside from Governors, did not play prominent roles
in state cabinet discussions and since 1967 a definite effort
has been undertaken to incorporate civilians into federal and
state executive positions.

Civilian commissioners exercise

c�nsiderable authority within the civil service operations· and the
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cabinets appeared t o be highly p oliticized b odies (the speeial
ization of institutions described by Welch as a step in the
development of a p olitical system). (Bienen, 1978, p. 210-212).
In its attempt t o evaluate the performance of the military
regime during the 1970s in Nigeria as a promoter of · econ omic
devel opment this paper will be concerned with the various data
'

which economists frequently refer t o in order t o judge econ omic
devel opmental strategies.

However, it is important that from

the onset we realize that while statistics c oncerning growth
rates in Domestic National Product and per capita income are im
portant indicators of econ omic growth, the concern of political
scientists and economists should be with economic development as
well as economic growth.

Often g�owth rates may be deceptive in

that while gr owth appears c ontinuous, real development may not
occur and n o real distribution of new wealth may be realized.
While p ost-1949 China realized only marginal real gr owth rates,
development did occur and for the first time in that nation's
hist ory its p opulace was fed, cared for, and the real c ompre
hensive development of infrastructures started to be initiated.
C onve·rsely, while in p ost-WW I I Brazilian economic growth has been
marvelled at by various econ omists and p olitical scientists alike,
no real attempt has been seen to distribute.the increased growth
in any equitable manner as the beneficiaries of the rapid eco
nomic growth have been the elites.
The concern of this paper with development as opposed merely
to growth al one, means that what will be studied is the am ounts
of capital invested by the g overnment in the creation and main-
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tenance of the various infrastructures which are the essentials
as conduits of economic and also political development.

The pri

orities of the military regime will be explored in terms of bud
get allocations and capital investments, and deficiencies in the
overall planning will be explored, and possible remedies discussed.
An emphasis on development means that this paper will be
'

�oncerned with examining the development as well as the refinement of those physical infrastructures which are so essential if
a nation's economic development is to be fostered, and more
specifically include transportation, communication, agricultural,
educational, and industrial structures upon which the nation can
build the bases for its pursuit of economic development.

Import

export figures will be examined in order to try and determine
areas in productivity in which the Nigerian economy is growing,
declining, or merely stagnating, and ma jor shifts in the emphasis
of the regime's planning will be explored for possible negative
or positive impacts on the future economic growth and development
of the nation.
When one considers the colonial experiences of the nation of
Nigeria it is not·s�prising that one finds serious problems still
facing that nation in the area of economic development.

If one

is to compare the majdr deficiencies found in most of the devel
oping countries at the times of their independence with George
Masannat's list of factors which inhibit economic progress it is
remarkable how many of those factors are present in Nigeria as
well as. other developing nations.

Masannat lists the following
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factors which impede economic developmenta

(1) Capital shortages1
(2) Low per capita incomesa
(3) Low savings levelsJ
(4) A lack of technological skillsa
(5) Poor utilization of human and natural resourcesa
(6)· Low levels of productivitya
(7) High birth rates and declining death ratesa
(8) High illiteracy rates;
(9) An Agrarian economy1
(10) Inadequate communication and transportation systems;

(11) A scarcity of natural resources:
(12) Limited social mobility;

(13) Unfavorable political conditions:
(14) Weak and arbitrary tax systemsa
(15) Corrupt public administration;
(16) An absence of a strong middle class;
(17) A tradition-bound society:
(18) A lack of land reform;

· (19) A lack of organized marketing;
(20) A suspicion of and discrimination against �oreign
exports and capital. (Masannat, 1973. P• 209).
While it is evident that Nigeria does not possess all twenty
of these factors which inhibit economic progress, it is also just
as evident that Nigeria, like the other former colonies in Africa,
possesses enough of-these criteria to seriously have impeded

-20-

development efforts , and the particular criteria which apply spe
cifically to the Nigerian experiences will be fully detailed in
the body of this presentation.

11.
1.

The Political Economy of Nigeria a
Defining Political Economy a
As stated in the introduction, the economic development

of Nigeria, as is the case of any nation, both past and present ,
depends on other dynamics within the Nigerian context , as well
as within the wider dimensions of the world international system.
In defining ·the concept of political economy• Gut land and Wal
lerstein stated that the idea of political economy emphasizes
the intermeshing of political , economic , and social factors of
change in one ongoing historical process .

They further e laborate

that the dynamics of such change emerges from the continuing
interplay of economic forces and related social classes and that
underdevelopment itself is not a condition of being seve�al cen
turies behind the transformations experienced in the world oapitalist sector , but rather a condition of satellization forced
upon the ·periphe ry .

The Western European nations from t he six

teenth century on were the core nations in terms of capitalist
economic development , and in fact it was during their mercan
tilist stage of economic development · that the first close eco
nomic ties were established between . these core countries and the
peripherial ones of Africa , Asia , and the Americas . ( Gutland and
Wallerstein, 1976, p . 12-17 ) .

-21-

Gutland and Wallerstein further contend that the relationship between African areas and European nations was an asymmetri
cal one as well as an unequal one and that the changes imposed
on peripheral nations were due largely to endogenous factors .
Furthermore , the incorporation of Africa into the world political
and economic system is seen as occurring in three major phases a
'

( 1 ) 1750-1900era, which transformed relations from relative autonomy to peripheralization and the expansion of the geographical
boundaries of the capitalist world economy s ( 2 ) 1900-1975 era,
which rested heavily on the extraction of raw materials and on the
exploitation of available low-cost labor s (J) 1976-present , is an
era whic� . _)las. presented Africa with a ma j or challenge a depende �t
development , or revolutionary transformation. ( Gutland and Wallerstein, 1976 , p . )2-50 ) .
2 . Nigerian Development Prior to British Colonial Rule s
The constant movements of · invaders from Egypt and the
Sudan into West Africa developed a fairly reliable network of
communications through the Sahara and laid down the foundat ion
for the trans -Saharan trade between North and West Africa.

By

A.n. ·1 , 00 0 , Kano , in Northern Nigeria , had developed into a
strong and prosperous trading center , and by the start of the
fifteenth centruy s ome of the main cities. in the North--Kano,
Zaria, Kalsina, and Sokota--had grown into great centers of com
merce . (Ekundare , 19?3. P• 10-11 ) .
The first contacts between the region which i s now Nigeria
.
.
and Europeans can be traced to the onset of the flourishing s lave
.
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trade when the French constructed

a

fort at E lmina in 1383.

How

ever, due to internal problems in France at that time in its his
tory , the fort ha4 to be abandoned , and it was not until the fif
teenth century that we can read well-d ocumented accounts of visits
by Europeans to the West African coas t .
The Portuguese brought the first slaves and gold dust se'

cured from West Africa to Lisbon in 1441 and also reconstructed
another fort at Elmina in 1482.

In 1485, Benin City was visited

by Portuguese who discovered easy access through a navigable river
as well as an organized kingdom and a powerful monarch.

Subse

quently missionaries sought to establish friendly relations with
the King of Benin and from 1481 until 1495 King John I I of Por
tugal e stablished a personal correspondence with the monarch of
Benin.

Other nations soon began expressing an interest in West

African trade and by 1553 British ships had reached the Benin
River and the extended relationship between Great Britain and
Nigeria was initiated . (Burns , 195 5 , p . 61-73 ) .
In 1588, a British Captain Welsh established trade ( e le
phant· teeth , pepper , palm oil ) with Nigeria and later returned in
'

1591 t o set up further commercial relations with that West African
region.

The discovery of North America and the establishment of

Spanish colonies in the West Indies had created an increased demand for slaves and in the sixteenth century , with the opening up
of West African trade , there was a virtual rush by Europeans to
obtain slaves from that region of Africa.

Sir John Hawkins was

the first British captain t o engage in the s lave trade·when he

transported three-hundred slaves · from S ierra Le one to Haiti .

After

he successfully accomplished that tas k , he was given, as a reward ,
command of a squadron of seven ships , the flagship . which was
named Jesus , t o carry on the African slave trade in the name · of
the British Empire .
1618 marked the year in which King James I of England first
granted a Charter t o a London-based company which was engaged in
the s lave trade and that company went on to construct Fort James
on the Gambia River .

In 1712 , the Treaty of Utrecht enabled the

British to se cure a thirty year monopoly on the s lave trade to
the Spanish colonies . and British influence in West Africa con
tinued to grow . ( Burns , 1955 , p.. 111-239 ) .
Thus far the contacts between the indigenous peoples of
West Africa and the Europeans was limited t o the minimal amount
necessary to establish �rade re lations between the various trading
companies and the coastal native elites who secured the Africans
from the interior to be sold in the New World.

Penetrations of

the interiors for other than exploratory purpos e s did not take
place unt il the actual colonization of the regions of West Africa
by t}1e Europeans :J_ater in the s e.cond half of the nineteenth cen,

tury.
However , economic development was occilrring within the Ni
gerian region prior to colonialization; and although both France
and Great Britain tried to create the illusion that the African
continent had no social or political history piror to contacts
with the Europeans , much less any economic history, evidenc�s of

development in all three areas are well-documented in historical
accounts of the Nigerian region by various European as well as
African historians , political scientists , and economist s .
Trading, administration , and manufacturing were wide spread
in Nigerian areas as fa! back as 1732 and by the mid-1800s sec'

ondary and tertiary activities had become diversified .

For ex-

ample , weavers , tanners , ' iron smelters , blacksmiths , sawyers ,
carpenters , and potters ( for various oils ) were all present in
Ibadan in 1851.

The urban economy of that region, was at that

point in time , dependent

on

slave labor in the agricultural sec

tor to provide the nec�ssary food supplies t o the urban centers .
(Smith , 1976 , p . 429-430 ) .
3� Increased British Penetrations and Colonial Rulea
The latter half of the nineteenth century was disrupted
by colonialization efforts by the British with the result ing pol
itical and institutional, as well as economic changes which were
imposed on the indigenous peoples .

Colonialization and its - far

reaching effects on native populati ons throughout the African con
tinent as well as within other peripheral regions of the capitalist
wor�d economic system was the major phenomenon in the modern
history of human relations which created the conditions leading
to the definition of " political economy" as a means of explaining degrees of underdevelopment found today throughout the d e 
veloping world .
The first direct interference in Nigerian political . affairs
came in · i851 with the British military ac·tions against LagQs
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in· an effort to force its monarch to abandon the s lave trade
(England by this t ime had become more " enlightened" concerning
the inherent evils of dealing with human live s ).

The Royal Niger

Company was formed in 1886 and its Charter gave it control over
all of Nigeria , includ ing the Northern region.

Also, in 1886 , the

British government proclaimed the Oil Rivers Protectorate over
the Niger Delta and established the colony of Lagos .
In 1893 the Niger Coast Protectorate was e stablished and
this marked the point when a well-organized governmental machinery
was established for the administration of colonial affairs.

In

1897 , the entire Yoruba land was annexed into Lago s , and in 1900.
the British took over the administration of Northern Nigeria and
prociaimed that area t o be the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria.
Finally, in 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were
amalgamated to officially form the nation of Nigeria. ( Ekundare .
19?3 , P · 12 ) .

·

'

Thus by the turn of this c�ntury B�itish penetrations , and
eventual political control over , the region that was to be Nigeria, were complete . At the same time . British penetrations
.
wers altering the political st�uctutes of the indigenous peoples ,
-

so were these penetrations also affecting the economic structures
of the native people s .

It i s these changes in the indigenous

economic structures which concern the orientation of this paper
as concerns the concept of political e conomy as an explanation

of the lack of economic development in colonial Nigeria.
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As the nineteenth century proceeded and the s lave trade
died out due to the pressures from the British metropole , ef
fects were felt by indigenous economies which had become depen
dent on the trade ( the Ashanti in part icular) as well as Euro
peans who likewise had developed a dependency on the s lave trade
(the Portuguese ) .

Economic substitutes soon grew up in Western

Africa including timber 'in Sierra Leone , palm oil in the Niger
Delta and Dahome y , groundnut oil in Gamb ia and Senegal.

However

at the same time that agricultural production was expanding in
response to colonial administrative efforts , economic activities
in Western Africa were deteriorating as blacksmithing and smelt
ing activities dec lined and iron ore mining and textile production
simi larly experiended a downward trend (as had indigenous economic
activities in India during the early years of British colonial
ization ) .

Compe tition from European manufacturers reduced indig

enous economic activities t o the production of raw materials ,
caused an urban to rural population shift , and created a colonial
market for European-manufactured finished good s . (Wallerstein,
1976 , P• J0-39 ) .
, The period from 1900-1929 is often referred to ·as · the per- · ·
iod of rapid export expans ion within Nigeria.

Great strides were

. taken in the development of an export ec onomy ·and export volumes
increased from only two percent of total GDP to a five to seven
percent figure . (Helleiner , 1966 , p. l-2J ) .

Important new cash

crops were groundnuts , cocoa, rubber, and cotton, resulting in
more and more peasants coming into contact with the world market s .

- .i;. , -

However, the overall structure of the economy and technological
levels change·d very little as the great bulk of e c onomic activity
cons isted of trading activities undertaken for dome stic use ra
ther than sales to world market s .

By 1929 , domestic trade ac

tivities accounted for 85 percent of the value of the GDP and this
trade base remained the dominant characteristic of the economy
(which was to establish

a

pre cedent for an internal orientation
,

by indigenous entrepreneurs as we ll as a concentration of those
entrepreneurs in trading as opposed to productive commercial
enterprise s , which has had serious effects on efforts at economic
deve lopment of an industrial infrastructure since independence ) .
Economic growth of the Nigerian nation was interrrupted from
1929 unti l 1945 , initially by the world depression, and then by
the Second World War.

The depression and the resulting world

wide collapse in commodity prices brought severe reductions in
Nigeria ' s export prices and stagnation in export volumes .

The

value . of cotton fell by 58 percent and rubber by 78 percent , in
terms of unit values , and by 90 percent and 88 percent , respec
tive ly ,· in terms of their export values . By the end of \tWI I ,
prices for commodities were still at only fifty perce.nt . of their
value , but import prices had risen sharply during the war years
due t o shipping sh�rtages and the �carcity of consumer good s .

Im

ports total costs rose by 100 percent during the 1939-1945 period
alone . (Helleiner , 1966 , p. 27-32 ) .
One structural change in Nigeria which was undertaken t o
cope with the wartime marketing conditions was the creation of
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statutory marketing boards which extended state control (mean
ing at this time colonial ) over marketing and the appropriation
of surplus value from the peasantry.

These boards proved effective

in subsidiz ing the costs of primary products for the British con
sumer and also withholding a share of the price from the farmers .
Since independence , the marketing boards have been used to fund
\

regional and state governmental activities , party campaigns , and
the consumption and accumulation of money by the rich and powerful
but they have never been used t o protect the farmers who bear the '
brunt of market fluctuations .

(Williams , 1976 , Gutland and Waller

stein , ed . , p. 141-152 ) .
After WWII rapid economic progres s started t o take place

·

and real growth of GDP was 4 . 1 percent annually from 1950-1958
and 4 . 5 percent from 1959- 196 ) .

The 1950s als o witnessed the

beginnings of industrial deve lopment and an increasing partici
pat ion t:r the government in all sectors of the economy .

Exports

of goods and services increased 117 percent during the 19501960 period , but at the same time imports rose by 246 percent ,
offsetting any real gains in Nigerian trade relationships .

A

pattern was also being set for the . reliance on imported consumer,
and in some instanc e s , basic , commodities .

The e conomy remained

overwhelmingly agricultural during the 1950 s , a trend which was
to have serious consequences when agricultural production started
to dec line in the 1960s .

Also during the 1950s government ex

penditures excee4ed those projected as being needed by the World

-29-

Bank , indicating spending irregularities as well as the stagnation
of prices for commodities which led to budget deficits starting
in 1955· ( Berry and Liedholm, 1970, P • 67-69 ) .
During the 1950-1962 period , agricultural exports increased
due to initial world price increases , and research programs were
expanded and also large-scale agricultural enterprises were started
to be promote d , although government-owned plantati�ns contributed
little to agricultural production output .

The industrial sector

of the economy, though sma l l , grew rapidly from 1950-1962 , although
mining was virtually stagnant unti l 1960 ( oi l was first seriously
drilled in 195e ) .

However, industrial deve lopment reflected the

regional variations which have been a part of the ethnic history
of the Nigerian state , as the majority of manufacturing was cen
tered around Lagos and during 1954-1957 , the most rapid economic
growth occurred in the Eastern and Northern regions .

The govern

ment attempted t o promote industrialization and growth through
the use of tax incentives , but �he transfer of authority to re
gions tended to promote interregional rivalries in economic sec
tors .
·

( Berry and Liedholdm, 19? 0 ,

p.

24-2 5 ) .

In regards to the establishment of infrastructures , 2 0 per

cent of all government expenditures were devoted to transportation
arid communication with resulting substantial increases in road
mileage and railroad tracks as well as bridges and te lephone and
telegraph facilities .

Within the area of education, the original

goal of free universal primary education soon faced financial and
staffing problems , as well as discrepancies between regions .
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While the Eastern and We stern regions devoted between 37-49 per
cent of their budgets to education, the Northern region never al
located more than 2 5 percent .

In the short run , education made

little contribution t o economic deve lopment due to a shortage of
teachers and their low level of quality and very little was done
to promote and increase secondary and higher educational facili
ties .

(Berry and Liedhol'm , 197 0 , p. 77-80 ) .
One pattern which was apparent at the close of the 1950s ,

and one which still effects the e c onomic· progres s of the nation
today, was the high level of domestic consumpti on in relation to
increases in GDP output .

While the GDP was increasing at a fairly

constant four percent annual rate during the 1950s , consumption
was relative constant at 90 percent of GDP and government consump
tion increased from J . 4 to 7 . 5 percent while gross domestic sav
ings was relatively constant at ten percent of GDP . (Hansen,
1976 , Gutland and · Wallerstein , ed. , p . 194 )

•

. With independence in 196 0 , the Nigerian e conomy was in a
position which made it difficult to predict the future of the
nation in t erms of e c onomic development .

Though rapid economic

· progress had occurred during the period from 1900-196 0 , serious
problems remained and important patterns were emerging.

The dom

ination of primary production in terms of exports meant an economy
based on commodities which were often at the mercy of those com
modity boards in Europe and North America.

A large percentage of

the in� igenous population w�o were engaged in other than agri
cultural-related· production were concentrated in trading activities
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not in productive commercial enterpris e s .

The government was

increasingly dominating economic planning and as a result was as
suming a large position in terms of its proportion ·of consumption
of the GDP.

Also regional inequalities in t erms of economic

development , and what exactly should be the nation ' s priorit ies
remained as impediments to the overall development of

a

Nigerian

economic system.

I I I . Economic Development in Nigeria Since Independence s
1.

The First Economic Development Plan, 1962-1968 :
The deve lopment of the industrial sector in the Nigerian

economy which had occurred since WWII was deve lopment based on
import substitution as well as foreign ownership.

In 196 3 , 68

percent of the shares of 321 concerns .were foreign-owned , with
64 percent of the total foreign investment being British. (Eicher
and Liedholm, 197 0 , p . 6�12 ) .

This domination of the industrial

economic sector by foreign interests vividly reflected the fact
that while 1960 may have marked the political independence of
the Nigerian nat ion, economically, the region

remained a product

of neo-colonialism.
The characteristics of the immedi�te post-independence eco
nomy of Nigeria is characterized by Lyle Hansen as the following s
( 1 ) A GDP derived predominantly from primary production
( but at a rate increas ing faster than the population ) .
( 2 ) A GDP increasing at a 4 percent annual rat e s

' ( 3 ) Gross fixed investment increasing as a share of
GDP from 7 percent ( 1950 ) to 1 5 percent ( 1960 ) with
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declining productivity cited as the reason;
( 4 ) Consumption relatively constant at 90 percent of
GDP while the government ' s share of consumption
was increasing rapidly from 3 . 4 to 7 . 5 percent i
( 5 ) Gross domestic savings relative constant at 10
percent of GDP. {Hanse n . 1976 . Gutland and Waller
stein ed

• •

' p . 194 ) .

The specific orientations of the first Nigerian economic
development plan which was to encompass the 1962-1968 era were
the following:
( 1 ) The formulation of government capital budgets in as
integrated a manner as possible r
( 2 ) The careful development of the implications of a11 ·
governmental capital expenditure s and policies in
the regular budge t s
( 3 ) The deve lopment o f overall economic policies spe
cifically towards the private sector and foreign
capital investments i
( 4 ) The building of institutions that could be · used
increasingly to execute policy and to increase the
flexibility of the economy. ( Stolpe r , 1976 . Gutland
and Wallerstein e d . , p . 222-223 ) .
These listed orientations of the early economic planning in
post-independence Nigeria reflected the fact that due to the rel
ative absence of Nigerian economic planners at independence , the
economic planning was put in the hands of two Ford Foundation
economists , who quite expe ctedly, reflected their Western training
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and biases as concerned strategies for ec onomic development .
Howeve r , in the initial efforts at the promot ion of economic
development within Nigeria, planners soon found that certain ques
tions
arose even in areas where it seemed that government-provided
/
.

>

services were necessary, and in fac t , essential.

Problems of

time sequences and of staffing were s ome of the more obvious
'

problems initially faced by the government as well as the problem
of what kinds of services could be provided at· any particular
point in time or even in the immed�ate future .

Problems of the

capital costs of maintaining . programs once initiated , as well
as the very real quest ion as to who should pay for the specific
services , also arose as well as the initial questions concerning
the providing of the initial capital to get these programs and
services initiated . ( Stolper , 1976 , Gutland and Wallerstein ed. ,
P•

224-227 ) .
Problems also arose during the early 1960s concerning the

allocative decisions which must be made by a government and the
budgeting process nece ssary t o finance individual pro jects as
well as the economic development of the nation as a whole .

A

lack of coordination between pro ject studies and budgeting had
been a problem with the governmental as well as private sector
. planne.rs in the past and also the ·11mi ted capabilities (at that
time ) of applying cost-benefit analyse s to pro jected programs and
policies hampered the government ' s effect ivenes s at promoting
economic planning and development .
lerstein e d . ,

p.

250 ) .

(Wells , 1976 , Gutlan� and Wal
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In..reviewing the budgets during the 1962-1968 development
program , one finds that only 1) . 6 percent of all governmental ex
penditures were devoted to primary production and this lack of
concern with agricultural development seems to have reflected the
uti�ization of the Western-oriented economists who place almost
all of their emphasis on rapid industrial deve lopment of the
economy.

It was during the first years of independence that it
�

first be came evident that agricultural production was in fact
deelining as a proportion of GDP , a decline which reflected past
policies ( such as the establishment of the marketing boards ) as
well as an orientation by the new leadership towards industrial
growt h , almost exclusively.
·

Problems encountered in attempts in the early 1960s at pro

mulgating a comprehensive program for Nigerian e c onomic develop
ment were in part a result of the intellectual traditions in Ni
gerian planning.

From 1946 , when Nigerians were first given any

real responsibility for their own e c onomi� development unti l the
present , the basic planning traditions have been rooted in Western
capitalist economic s .

The intellectual philosophy has essentially

been .cap�talist empiricism marked by its pragmatism and . piece
mean approach to socio-economic problems , and as a result , com
prehensive planning was substituted with planning of a mixed '
economy.

The re liance on bourgeoise economics ha� meant · a re

liance on the dynami�s of the Keynesian economic variat of neo
classical economic planning with its concern with GDP growth,
capital-output ratio , and the creation of demand .
P · 2 97 ) .

( Onimode , 1977
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Inherent in this acceptance of neo-classical economic think
ing has been the primary belief that increases in GDP will s o lve
the problems of underdevelopment , and planning is purely con
ceived of as a technical process of aggregating pro jects and
programs with the subsequent implementation of these pro j e cts and
programs seen merely as the spending of allocated funds for the
'

�pecific purposes envisioned .

The fact that the economy of post-

independence Nigeria remained a neo-coloni�l one due to the amounts
.)
of foreign investment s , also meant that s ome problems which needed
to be considered often

·

were ignored .

Conc�ptual limits as regards the caus e s of underdeve lopment
were very evident in the ea�ly planning of an independent Nigerian
economy and these included the fact that structural economic
change s were necessary, not just a raising of GDP growth rates ;
changes which must include some nationalization of the economy and
an e l evation of heavy industrialization to the forefront of the
economic plans while not ignoring the real needs and problems being
encountered in agricultural production.

Methodological problems

also were encountered in that while spending by the government was
emphasized (again Keynesian economics ) , construction of infrastructures were ignored to a very large extent , infrastructures
which due to -the colonial experiences and constraints within
Niger.la had not developed as part of
aspect of economic deve lopment .

a

natural and more normal

A " textile first" approach was

used by early Nigerian and W e stern planners in terms of invest
ment allocations , with the result that core heavy industries were

Also planning was not concrete in that

were re latively ignored .

targets for various sectors and pro jects were not established
in concrete material terms ( a problem which economic planners were
to run into in the 1970s , as goals and aims of deve lopment were ,
and still are , often presented in broad , ambiguous terms geared
at creating favorable political and societal acceptance ) . Another
'

failure in early economic planning was the lack of

a.

multi9.is-

ciplinary approach t o resolving economic problems and priorities
.

/

J

as all planning tended to be dominated by economlsts . °( Onimode ,
�97 7 , p . 301-303 ) .

Problems - encountered in planning were further

magnified by the fact that political power remained in the regions
and in terms of manpower the regions were in a much better posi
tion than was the federal government.

The federal government ,

in fact , often lacked trained e conomists , and as already stated ,
was forced to rely on economists supplied from the West , economists
- trained in traditional economic planning.

Effective planning was

furthe� thwarted by the absence of reliable statistics upon which
to pro ject expected growth rates .

( Aboyad e , 1966 , p . 154-168 ) .

2 . The Civil War and Instability, 1965- 1970 1
.
Although it is more than apparent that rea1 · p�6blems were
being enc ountered in the implementation of the first economic
devel opment plan for the years 1962-1968 , the real success or
failure of the first real attempt at Nigerian economic develop
ment is impossible to evaluate due to the outbreak of the Civil
War in 196 5 . ·· while the disadvantages of colonialization have
been briefly dealt with already as regards economic and political
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development , the effects it had within the Nigerian nation in the
political arena became all too apparent in the first few years of
independence .

The strengthening of ethnic divisions th�ough the

British colonial policy of indirect rule which maintained re
gional and ethnic divisions , and the lack of efforts at the pro- .
motion of

a

strong �entral government for other than administrative

purpose s , meant that in t he . Post-independence period , a jockeying
and maneuvering of positions was constantly taking place between
the many ethnic groups of the regions , the Hausa-Fulanis , Ibos ,
and Yorubas .

�

Also the fact that the British . colonial poli�

was based on the most economical means possible meant that ed
ucation for the indigenous peoples had been all but ignored and
this ip turn retarded the development of a local modern elite to
take over the management of political and economic institutions
after independence .

( S chmitt , 19?4, p . 120-135 ) .

The real importance in education as a basis for political
development is · a1so discussed by Lipset and from his surveys he
re�che s the conclusions that a nation' s level of education is
strongly correlated to that nation' s populace ' s receptiveness
towards democracy�

Correspondingly·, Lipset contends that the

rise in educational levels , which is a direct result of economic
development efforts ,. corresponds to the ris� of a middle class , ·
an other prerequisite ·for political development .

{ Lipse t , 1962 ,

P• 38 ) .
The political maneuverings which were occurring throughout
the early 1960s finally resulted in the attempt by the Ibos at
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a Biafran secession , with the ensuing years of internal war , as
the federal government attempted to isolate the movement and
prevent a precedent from being established for the fragmentation
of the Nigerian stat e .

As already discussed , one of the reasons .

cited by Potholm for the intervention of the military in govern
ments in African nations was the breakdown in civilian governments
'

and a concern by the military to prevent the total collapse of the
political - system.

Also Potholm listed ethnic conflicts within
\

.

the military and the need of a group ·. to arbitrate conflicts between soeietal groups as reasons for the intrusion of the mil
itary in government , reasons well evident in the early years of
Nigerian independence.
Whatever the results of this extended period of instability
has had and will cont inue t o have on the political deve lopment of
Nigeria , there can be no doubt that for five years the economic
development of the nation was at a virtual standstill.

It was

only because petroleum was increasingly becoming more imrortant
to the export earnings and its partial d isruptions in production
during the war years were being temporarily filled by increases in
agricultural production, that the federal government was · even
able to finance the eventually successful campaign to halt the
secessionist movement .

However, the rest of. the plans for the

development of the economy had to take a back seat as the pri�
mary concern of the federal government was the maintenance of
the Nigerian state , through the complete domina'tion of the se
cessionist movement . Again i t i s Potholm who lists the major
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goals of any political system and at the top of the list he
places the very survival of the systems
( 1 ) Survival--the most universally articulated and pur
sued goal of any political system is the endurance
of the system as ari entity;
( 2 ) Freedom--another goal is freedom from the controls
'

of others , a concept which in an interdependent
world is becoming more and more �elat ive 1
( 3 ) Stability--refers to the attempt to preserve the
existi.ng political structure and its societal and
economic underpinnings :
( 4 ) Political development i
( 5 ) Economic development ;
( 6 ) We lfare--the physical and psychological well-being
of a nation' s populace s
( ? ) Democratic and/or Command decision making--refers
t o the attempt to compromise the methods in which
key decisions are made between including the masses
while at the same time maintaining some degree of
elite control ;
( 8 ) International objectives--which may include the
pursuit of prest ige , influence , and conquest . ( Pot
holm, 1970, p . 29 ) .

IV. Economic Development in the 1970s a
. . 1. The Second Development Plan, 1970-1974 1

On the basis of statistics alone , the four years follow�
ing the c onclusion of the Civil War and a resumption of more

or

less normal , . stable internal economic relations , were years of
successful growth in purely economic terms .
"

In the years from

1970-1974 the GDP doubled from the 1960 figure with high growth
rates of 8 . 5 percent i� 1972-1973 and 12 . 5 percent in 19?4-

Man

ufacturing do_u bled its s'hare of the e conomy from 5-10 percent
by 1973 and in terms of raw economic figures grew from a mere
38 million naira · ( the naira is worth approximately . 65 in u . s .
currency ) in 1960 to 6 . 0 billion naira in 1974.

The nation' s

balance of payments were in the black in 1974, after experiencing
a 38 million naira deficit in 1973· ( Gambari , 197 5 , p . 1 58 ) .
Howeve r , once again in the Nigerian example of 1970-1974,
we have observed a common phenomenon in economic growth theorie s ,
the example where economic growth has not been accompanied by
economic development .

It is true that based on statistics alone

it appeared that the Nigerian economy ·was grwoing rapidly during
the period under observation, howeve�. when one examines the
particular four years a little more closely, one becomes aware
of the �eal story behind the so-called early deve lopme�tal trends
within the Nigerian economy.
While there c�n be no doubt that the growth rates indicated
already were indeed being achieve d , the rates at which e conomic
growth appeared to be heading were i�dicative of only one major
primary product , crude petroleum , and the fact that in tt:ie· 19731974 period the world prices for OPEC petroleum qu�druple� .

The·
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increasing importance of petroleum and its by-products within the
Nigerian economy is illustrated by studying the rapid increases
in the percentages of government revenues generated from that
particular sector of the e conomy a
Table !--Government Revenue Sources, 1970 - 1975 i
Year

Total (million naira )

Petroleum Revenue

� of Total

1970

633 . 2

166 . 4

26 . 3

1971

1169 . 0

1510 . 2

4) . 6

1972

1404 . 8

2764 . 3

54. 4

1973

1695 . 3

1016 . 0

59 . 9

1974

4537 . 0

3726 . 7

82 . 1

19 75

5514 . 7

4272. 5

77 . 5

( Panter-Brick , 1978, P • 152 ) .
While petroleum was growing fivefold in volume of produc
tion, its price value , due to the unique set of political cir
cumstances which were prevalent in 1973-1974, was increasing
thirtyfold .

The importance of petroleum in terms of export earn

ings is similarly reflected in the following data concerning
the export structure of Nigeria in 1973, before the quadrupling
of tne prices of oi� ( in thousands of u . s . dollars ) a ·
Table I I--Nigerian Export Structure, 197J a
( 1 ) All Commodities

3 . '344 , 697

( 2 ) crude Petroleum

2 , 7 7 5 , 700

( J ) Cocoa

2 02 , 000

( 4 ) Oil Seeds , . Nuts , Kerne ls

112 , 599

( 5 ) Fixed Vegetable Oils ( soft )

36, 564
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( 6 ) Animal Food

3 5 . 499

( ? ) Special Transactions

3 1 , 357

( 8 ) Rubber ( synthetic )

29 .482

( 9 ) Tin

2 3 , 492

tlO ) Hides

18 , 983

( 11 ) Wood

14 , 503

( 1 2 ) Fixed Vegetable Oil ( nonsoft )

1 1 , 836

( 1 3 ) Petroleum products

l 0 , 930

( 14 ) Leather

1 0 , 444

( 1 5 ) Cotton

1 . 176

( 16 ) Remainder

2 4 , 132

(Handbook of International Trade Statistics , 1977. p . 149 ) .
Another problems which was l ooming in the near future was
the relat ive decline of agriculture as an important earner _ of
export income .

While petroleum production was increasing fivefold ,

in terms of volume during the years of the second development
plan , agriculture contributed nuthing towards the economic de
velopment of Nigeria.

In fact , there has been a 40 percent de

cline in the volume of agricultural production between 1964-1966
-

.

peri'od and 1972-1974. ( Handbook. of International Trade Statistics ,
197 7 . p . 198 ) .

The rapid growth in agricultural production ex

perienced during the Civil War was _ a mis leading projector of
future trends and as previously mentioned , more accurately re
flected a temporary decline in petroleum production with agri
culture filling the gap only during the war years .
'

The precarious pasition of the Nigerian economy during the
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second economic development plan is further i l lustrated when one
observes the fact that aside from crude petroleum, the rest of
the export. earners during the 1973 period were primary products ,
products which depend on increased agricultural production, at a
time when agricultural production in Nigeria was · in . fact ·declining
As

all of those who are concerned with economic deve lopment re'

alize , a nation that depends on the fluctuations of the world
commodity markets to finance further economic development , par
ticularly whan that nation' s agricultural production is declin
ing , is a nation failing to comprehend the true interactions in
the world ' s economic order as it is determined by the Western
industrialized states which establish the ground-rules for in
ternational trad e .
During the same period that Nigeria was experiencing a rapid
economic growth rate due t o the increases in Petroleum production
and increases in the value of petroleum products , it remained de
pendent on the industrial nations of the West for manufactured
goods , and even some of the basic essentials. such as cement and
steell and iron products , which are of vital importance in any
effort t o · promote industrial development and the establishment of
basic industrial infrastructures .

The following figure� reflect

the faqt that due to the nature of its economic development during
the colonial period , a time when a major emphasis was placed on
primary production, the Nigerian ec onomy in the early 1970s , re
mained saddeled with a trade deficit as it attempted to indus 
�rialize its econo�y a
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Table III--Nigerian Imports (millions of u . s . dol lars ) s
( 1 ) 1970

1 , 308

( 2 ) 197 3

2 , 736

( 3 ) 1974

4 , 332

( 4 ) 197 5

. 8 , 179 .

( .5 ) Percent of Change--22 0 . 6 �Handbook of International
'

Trade and Development Statistics , 197 7 . p. 198 ) .
Table IV--Nigerian Exports (millions of U� S . dollars ) s
( 1 ) - .1970

. 1 01 . 8

( 2 ) 1973

136 . 6

( 3 ) 1974

228 . 6

( 4 ) 1975

1108 . 2 (Handbook of International Trade

and Develonment Statistics , 197 7 . p . 198 ) .

Another measure of the failure of economic development as
. opposed to economic growth in Nigeria in the early 1970s is the
total values of the various sectors of the economy in terms of the
total export structure as is shown belowa
Table V--Nigerian Export Structure/Percentage Share · of Total a
( 1 ) Total Value (mllli ons of u� s . dollars ) a
a . 1970

1 , 149 . 1

b . 1973

3 , 345 . 4

c . 19 74

9 , 354. 7

d . 1975

7 , 82 9 ; 7

( 2 ) Food ItemsLPercentage of Total a

-4 5-.

a . 1970

33. 5

b. 19 73

12 . 12

c . 1974

4 . 97

d . 1975

5. 27

( J ) Agricultural Raw Materials/Percentage of Total a
a . 1970
b . 1973

5 . 46
'

2 . 29

c . 1974

0 . 99

d . 1975

0.60

( 4 ) Fuels/Percentage of Total s
a . 1970

55. 28

b . 1973

83. 30

c . 1974

93. 60

d . 1975

93 . 21

( 5 ) Ores and Metals/Percentage of Tota l •

·

a . 1970

4. 49

b . 197 3

0 . 80

c . 1974

0 . 52

d . 1975

0 . 47

( 6 ) · Manufactured ·Goods/Percentage of Tota l a
a . 1970

0. 77

b. 19 73.

0 . 52

1974

0 . 19

' d . 1975

0 . 17

C•

( 7 ) Chemical Products/Percentage of Tota l s
a . 1970

0 . 03
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b . 1973

0 . 04

c . 1974

0 . 03

d . 1915

0 . 03

( 8 ) Other Manufactured Goods/Percentage of Total a
a . 1970

0 . 74

b . 1973

0 . 48

c . 1974
d . 1975

'

0 . 17
0 . 15 (Handbook of International Trade

and Develo12ment Statist ics , 1977 , P • 113 ) . .

As the above figures indicat e , whil e petroleum and its by
p�oducts were steadily increasing as the d ominant area in Ni
gerian exports , agricultural products were on a steady decline .
What is also significant is the fact that despite the aims of
the military government concerning the promotion of industrial
economic development , manufactured goods also experienced a
decline in their share of export earnings during the years of
the second economic deve lopment program .
As already discussed , the demise of agriculture was a sur
prise to the economic planners in Nigeria · due to the fact that
thes e planners had pro jected the ini'lated growth rates in agri
oultural production realized during the Civil War years as con
tinuing in the post-war period.

Economists forecast agricul

t�ral production as providing 50 percent of the nation ' s GDP
in the immediate future , which they felt would be enough for
local consumption needs as well as enough for export earn�ngs .

-.... ,

-

Further , the forces of supply and demand seem to have had little
effect at stemming the decline in agricultural production as the
total production of cocoa in Nigeria fell from 350 , 000 tons in
1970 to 196 , 000 tons in 1975-1976 , even though the world prices
for cocoa beans have been s oaring during the same period .

Once

the world ' s la�gest producer of palm oil and groundnuts , Nigeria
now must import both of these primary products to meet its own
domestic needs .

(Joseph, 197 8 , p . 231 )

•.

Various reasons are given for the decline in agricultural
production in Nigeria during the early 1970s and include s
( 1 ) An inadequate land tenure system resulting in the
fragmentation of hold ings ( the prevalence of pea
sant farmers ) s
( 2 ) Low rate of yields due to unimproved crop vari
(etie s , _dee.lining fertility of the soil , under-use
of fertilizers , and low levels of agricultural
technology a
( 3 ) Natural impediments such as droughts , crop disease ,
and infe station;
( 4 ) Ins).lfficient capital resources were provid.ed during
the first fifteen years of Nigeria ' s independence
( Joseph, 1978 , p . 231-232 ) .
Further evidence of the lack of concern with agricultural
development is the fact that within Nigeria only 30 percent of
the arable land is presently under cult ivation.

As a result

of stagnation in the agricultural sector , by 1976 , �1 · 5 percent ·

-
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of Nigeria ' s domestic consumption needs had to be imported , in
spite of the fact that at the start of the 1970s , that figure
had been only 20 percent . (Fa jana, 197 7 , p . 515 ) ·
Import substitution was one method seen by Nigerian eco
nomic planners as a means of all�viating the imbalan�e in export
earnings and also inoreasing the nation ' s industrial sector ' s
share of the export market .

Historically, import substitution

had been viewed by the colonial administrators · as a useful de
vice for the development of internal e conomic struct\ires in
Nigeria , although from the WWII period up until the late 1950s
import substitution had been employed by the British for the
exclusive purpose of the convertibility of sterling (as the Bri
tish f�ced severe financial problems in their post-war economic
development efforts themselves ) and had no real ob jectives in
terms of Nigerian economic deve lopment .

However , with indepen

dence , industrialization became the primary objective behind the
emphasis on the substitution of indigenous products for imported
ones .

Yet the efforts at successfully implementing an import

substitution program have been continuoudly hampered in the past
and the present by several problems including the widespread
corruption found in government at all levels of· administration.
Als o , decis ions concerning s ubstitutions we�e often based on
non-detailed and inadequate information and there was . also an
inadequacy in enforcement mechanisms.

(Fa jana ,_ 197 7 , p . 517 ) .

During the first development plan the primary means of at
taining import substitutions had been through the application of
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import tariffs on none ssential goods in order to encourage the
growth of Nigerian consumer industries .

However , the interrup

tion of the Civil War years and the rising importance of crude
petroleum in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the balance of
payments for Nigeria, meant , in reality, that the import bill
of c onsumer goods dropped only 24 percent in its first seven
'
years of the application of the substitution policy, and aside
from fueling inflation because of the increased cost of many goods
which have not become produced domestically, efforts at promot
ing import substitution have often resulted in the promotion and
maintenance of inefficient indigenous enterpris e s .

The textile

and tobacco industries , for example , have had to rely heavily on
high tariff protection, yet the export earnings of textiles has
fallen by 46 . 2 percent .

( Ogbonna , 1976 • p . 296-297 ) .

While in some areas import substitution. .appears t o have
been relatively successful such as the beer and stout industries ,
the import of such essential material for development such as
cement actually increased during the 1970-1974 period , partially
in response to an ambitious deve lopment program , but also par
tialJy due· to the · ineffect ivenes s at the promotion of an indig
enous cement industry. ( Ogbonna, 1976 , p . 298 ) .
An overview of the policy of import substitution as effected
during the first five years following the Civil War r�veals that
several problems were beginning to surface , inc luding the fact
that since dependable internal markets are often lacking for
certain manufactured good-s , the diversification of exports via
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Cotton textiles

import substitutions is often very limite d .

is the only area where the domestic demand and supply has been
gapped through the substitut�on policy.

Also limiting the ex

port capabilities of the substitutution orientation is the fact
that as a large nation in terms �f population, Nigeria ' s large
internal market often absorbs many goods which could be exported
to earn foreign exchange :

As previously indicated , the consump

tion growth and productive capacities of the Nigerian economy
have grown at appro�lmately equal rates . · A final point to be
made concerning Nigeria ' s early efforts at promoting import sub
stitution is the fact that since substitution has been concen
trated in the final production stages , economic dependence on
materials , parts , and components has been created .

( Ogbonna ,

197$ , P · JOO ) .
Potential future impacts of these efforts at import substi
tution include the · lack of backward and forward linkage in this
type 9f an industrialization program due to the fact that what
industrialization which does take place is occurring s imply as a
result of substitution policies and artificial protective bar
riers without much real value being added.

·

Another point which

must be considered is that while import substitution raises the
per capita income leve l , it also redistributes the income level
in favor of urbanites , whose expenditure patterns typically make
up the highest proportion of all imports , especially imports of
nonessential good s .

All in all , the most positive benefit o!

the substitution policy, aside from the small savings in foreign

exchange which were realized , has been the experience learned
during the evolution of the process as . observed by various Ni
gerian economic planner s . ( Ogbonna , 19? 6 , P• )01 ) .
2 . The Third Economic Development Plan, 1975- 198 0 1
I n 19?5 , a military coup replaced General Gowon , the
leader of the military government for the previous seven years .
This move , however , reflected politics much more than any spe
cific dissatisfactions with economic policies other than the
widespread corruption which had festered under Gowon' s tenure .
Since this paper' s major concern is the economic deve lopment
during the 19?0s , it will not go into details concerning the pol
itical maneuverings behind the 19?5 coup , and it-is mentioned pri
marily ·to make the reader aware of the fact that during the first
year of the third economic development plan, the nation ' s leader
ship changed , but the goals of the economic program had already
been planned with the result that the new regime leadership was
initially forced to merely play the role of an implementer in the
area of economic development , although some specific changes were
sought and will be detailed . later in this paper .
As briefly discussed earlier, the oil boom of 19?3�19?4 , with
the quadrupling in prices for crude petroleum , created s omething
of an . aura of · over-optimism among Nigerian economic planners .
However , the boom, in reality, lasted a little more than one year,
and that year ' s increase was due only to the price increases , not
to any increases in productivity.

Yet the third e conomic devel

opment plan reflected the optimism of the 1974-19?4 period · and
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the general fee ling among economic planners was that for the near
future there would be no financial restraints on Nigerian . economic
development pro j e ct s .

In reality, the brevity o f the oil boom is

reflected in the fact that while Ni geria enjoyed a balance of
payments surplus in 1975 of 158 million naira , in 1976 , it had
a deficit of Z41 . 6 million naira , and by 1978 the government
found it necessary t o seek $1 billion in foreign loans due to
the s lackening of oil prices at the same time that industrial and
consumer goods were finally starting to really reflect the 19731974 increase in crude petroleum price s . ( Joseph , 1978 , p. 236 ) .
One has to keep in mind that the third economic development
plan was formulated during the 1973 period , and thus it reflected
the affluence of that period as 45 billi on naira was pro jected
for spending on e conomic development , with JO billion coming from
state and federal funding and 15 billion from private source s .
Economic develo pment and. growth pro jections were based on crude
petroleum export earnings , which accounted for 85 percent of total
export earnings , however , higher priority was finally being given
to agricultural production. which had stagnated to the point where
to not take heed at . the potential problems entailed by a further
dec line in agricultural output would have had seri ous consequences .
Industrialization was also given a high priority in the 1975-1980
development program as it reflected a desire by Nigerian economists
to eventually have the nation ' s e conomy compete , Japanese-styl e ,
with the industrialized countries of the wor�. .. (Herskovits ,
i 9?5, P · ) 18 ) .
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A . O . Lewis does an extensive analys is of the objectives of
the third development plan in a March . 1977 issue of DeveloDing
Economies .. In his analysis of the objective s . Lewis lists
several ambiguous ones including the overall desire to establish
the nation of Nigeria as a
( 1 ) A united . strong . and s e lf-reliant nations
( 2 ) A great . and dynamic ec onomic system s
( 3 ) A just and egalitarian societys
( 4 ) A land of bright and full opportunities for all of
its citizens s

·

( 5 ) A free and democratic society. ( Lewi s . 197 7 . p . 90 ) .
Lewis goes further t o define the methods listed by the Ni
gerian economic planners as being necessary for the implementation
of the above stated goals a
( 1 ) Continuous increases in the per capita income leve l s
.
( 2 ) A more even distribution of incomes a
( 3 ) A reduction in unemployment leve ls a
( 4 ) An increase in the supply of high-level manpower a
( 5 ) Economic diversification}
( 6 ) Balanced economic development r
( 7 ) Indigenization of economic activi t i e s . ( Lewi s . 1977.
P•

61 ) .

S ome of the criticisms Lewis makes of the 1975-1980 plan are
related to the ambiguity of some of the stated ob je ctives of the
plan.

For instance . he cites the failure of the plan to . give

concrete meanings t o some of its objectives as being an imped-
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iment to tr�ly gauging the plan' s progres s .

Lewis further adds

that some of the objectives are not only nebulous but not related
t o any specific time period and some of the o�jectives even ap
pear to be contradictory, yet no attempts have been made to re
concile the points of contention.

He also finds evidence of an

" overloading" of some of the objectives in order to make them
more politically appealing.
The emphasis placed by the planners on economic se lf-suf
ficiency in turn relies on the assumption ,. · that oil will remain
�

potent force for - the forseeable future , yet the Nigerian sup

plies are obviously limited and the effectiveness of petroleum
t o promote economic development in the specific Nigerian case
has already been shown to have been over-ambitious .

There is

also a need t o clarify what the :phrase " equitable e conomic
d istribution" encompasses and if indeed it is an attainable goal.
The concept of balanced deve lopment also needs clarification-
shou'i<! all states grow at equal rates or should not the compar
ative _advantages of some of the states influence their individual
growth potentials .

(Lewis , 19? 7 . p . 69 ) .

The third economic development plan does recognize the need
to promote agricultural production. and development and its policy
to do so includes the following major points •
( 1 ) Price and tax incentives t o increase production;
( 2 ) Subsidization of essential inputs to increase pro
duction s
( 3 ) The establishment of accessible agricultural credit ;
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( 4 ) Increased ease of marketing and processing through
the construction of the appropriate infrastructures
and institutions ;
( 5 ) The creation of a national extension service network ;
( 6 ) Rehabilitation and new planting scheme s . ( Lewis ,
197 7 . P• 69-70 ) .
Once again , Lewis has s ome specific criticisms of the -pro
posed and already implemented agricultural policies contained
within the 1975-1980 development plan.

He fee l s , for instance ,

that some of the proposed measures for increasing agricultura l '
production are based on an insufficient appreciation of the real
problems confronting the agricultural sector in Nigeria.

Spe

cifically, the scarcity of labor in many rural areas ( due to the
general rural-urban migratory trends being experienced in Nigeria
as it is in the majority of the developing nations ) and the very
real fact that increases in producer prices over the past ten
years have not increased production ( the already cited exampler
of the decline in cocoa production ) .
Lewis further feels that there is a need t o balance the aid
.

.

given to rural areas s o it more evenly corresponds t o urban aid
(an obviously political as well as economic problem ) and the need
· to get · industrie s , especially agro-related one s , to rural areas .
He also sees the present system of peasant farming as being out
dated and a need to replace it with larger farms which would be
better able to utilize modern farming te chniques and implements
{not necessarily a move towards the massive collectivization such
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as occurred in the Soviet Union i the average peasant holding in
Nigeria ranges from 3 to ? acres and because of heredity and com
munal rights which are widespread , the peasant acreage is con
tinuously being further fragmented ) .

Along with this basis struc

tural change in farming methods , · Lewis sees a need to emphasize
cooperation and cooperative ventures between various farmers and
'

the e stablishement of a netWQrk of state farms and plantations.
( Lewis , 197 7 , P• 70 ) .
Another major area in which Lewis faults the third economic
development plan is in its re lative absence of a regulatory
framework for the private sector.

In fact , he comments that at

noticeable feature of the plan is the virtual absence of a reg
ulatory. framework for the control of the economy.

The only major

fiscal concern s eems to be the controlling of the money supply ,
easing import restrictions ( although is is necessary t o promote
indigenous development to maintain s ome sort of a tariff barrier ) ,
and an increased government participation in foreign-owned bank s .
In regards t o manufacturing, the private sector is banned
from invest ing in defense industries and s ecurity printing .

The

government al�o has a majority interest in all phases of · the pe
troleum industry, but otherwise it appears that the planners
.

want�d t o pursue a laizze faire economic program of development .
Lewis part icularly cites this last observation and points out
that past history has shown that governments which do not conttol
their economies cannot plan.. their development in an effective.
manner .
. ,

Also the re liance solely on fiscal and �onetary con�rols

-57 -

t o curb in£lation in the past has never succeeded . ( Lewis , 197 7 ,
P · 71-73 ) .
3 . The Indigenization Program s
One of the major objectives of the 1975-1980 plan, the
indigeni zation of the economy , deserves further e laboration since
it is probably the one action which the new government has de'

creed which has had the most impact on the original economic de.

velopment plan as prepared under the Gowon regime .

The Nigerian

Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1977 set' a deadline of December
3 1 , 1978 for the Nigerianization of the enterprises specified
under the Act , and by the original deadline , only 30 out of 1 , 120
enterprises had not complied with the edict .
�he policy of indigenization, or more accurately, Nigerian
ization, had three ma jor thrusts--the Nigerianization of personnel ,
of ownership, and of control .

Enterprises were classified under

three schedules a
( 1 ) !he first schedule included enterprises reserved
solely for Nigerians , and included advertising ,
public relations , blending and bottling of alcoholic
drink s , candle manufacturing and all forms of gam
ing, department strbes with less than a two million
n�ira annual turnover , garme�t manufacturing , print
ing, and travel agencies i
( 2 ) The second schedule included those enterprises in
which Nigerians must have a sixty percent equity,
and consisted of boat-building, beer brewing ,
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clearing and forwarding agencie s , construction,
commercial, merchant , and development banking ,
cement and fertilizer production, soaps and detergent s , paper conversion, mining, insurance , and
metal container manufacturing i
'

( J ) The third schedule , requiring at least 40 percent
indigenous control , included drugs and medicine s ,
engines and turbine s , electrical appliances and
houseware s , watches and clocks , · aircraft , and text i le s . (West Africa, 1979 . p . )90 ) .
The indigenization program s ought to reduce Nigerian con
centrations of wealth by stipulating that no person_ would have
control of more than one enterprise which comes under the Act ' s
jurisdiction.

Schedule two and three enterpris e s are further

required to re serve ten percent of their total equity shares or
of the fraction of shares to be sold in affected enterpris e s for
employe es and ten percent of this share is to be �eserved for
nonmanagerial staff.

(West Africa , 19? 9 . P• 390 ) .

Few problems have been encountered s urrounding the skills '
of the new Nigerian managers and entrepreeurs in the enterprises
affected by the 1977 Decre e .

The predicted decline in foreign

investments has not materialized and inefficiencies are not increasing.

However , one area of concern is the shortage of high

l��el manpower , which in some areas remains acut e .

The Federal

Civil Service has a 55 percent vacancy rate for senior adminis-

trative staff, including a 6� percent vacancy rate for engineers
and surveyors , a 45 percent figure for senior administrators
and managerial staff, and a 60 percent rate for technical staff.
(West Africa , 1979 , p . 391 ) .
4 . The Results of the 1975-1980 Development Plan:
The Ec onomi st was already noting significant progres s
which was being made under the 1975-1980 economic development
plan after only its first year in operat ion.

�conomic growth

in 1976 was ten percent after a s luggish . 2 . 8 percent figure in
Inflation was also cut in 1976 t o 2 0 percent after reach
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ing the 30 percent figure in 1975 , with an attainable ultimate
goal of six percent annually being considered feasible ny the
year 1980.

Further , a diversification of the economic base is

being detected and hopes for an industrial breakthrough are being
pinned on iron and steel, as well as oil and petrochemical pro
British Petroleum and Shell were in 1977 already dis

duction.
cussing

·t

.1e construction of a liquified natural gas plant to

produce at least one billion cubic feet of gas a day and the
government has set aside 1 . 7 billion naira for the natural gas
industry to use for its development scheme s . (The Economist ,
'

- ·

197 7 , P • 103-104 ) .
In addition, new refineries are being built at Kaduna at a
cost of $600 miliion and at Warri for $215 million, and the ex
isting refinery at Port Hartcourt has been e xpanded .

Als o , a

huge network of pipeline is still under construction and eventually
will link the new refineries to the oil fields .

American aid is
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now being channe lled into certain specific development pro j e cts
and it is coming none too soon as the Soviets already in 1977
were deeply involved in designing the blast furnance being built
at A jaokuta in the Kwara Stat e .

Other industrialization pro j ects ,

including cement works , . pulp and · paper factories , vehicle manu
facturing plant s , and a fertilizer complex will bring industrial
'

investment to a total of $8 billion by 1980. (The Economist , 197 7 .
P • 10) ) .
More specifically, 29 pe rcent of the GDP is set to go into
economic investment by 1980 and big efforts are being made t o
improve the transportation infrastructure a s new berthing fa
cilities have been completed on Tin Can I s land .

Other infra

structure pro jects . inc lude a new hydro-electric . power station
t o be built at Jebba and a network of much needed good roads
covering the entire nation. (The Economist , 1977 r p . 103 ) .
The optimism expressed by ��e Economist after the third
economic development plan had been in operation for only one
year , must be regarded as a guarded optimism at best , partic
ularly when one considers the economic data from the years since
the · plan has been · i� force .

For instance , in its first year,

197 5 , the cost of the five year plan to the federal and state
governments had already increased from the original figure of
30 billion naira to 42 billion, a d ifrerence of 40 percent in
just one year of operation.

Total trade for the year 1975 in

creased by only 14 . 7 percent compared. to the 19?� figure of· ·
154 · 3 percent , which of course reflected the increase in the
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world mar�et price for crude petroleum.

Exports alone fell 1 5 - 1

percent in 1975 with t�e value of petroleum export earnings drop
ping 870 . 4 - million naira during that year.

Agricultural production

continued to dec line as the food import pill for the 1975-19?6
period alone was 354 million naira , and increase of 800 percent
from the 1969-1970 period .

(Africa Research Byl let in, .19Z( , p .

4127-4129 ) .
The statistics for the year of 19?6 , however , seem to re
flect that the e conomic deve lopment plan was starting to have
s·ome positive effects .

Whereas economic growth had been only

2 . 8 percent during 197 5 . this figure had increased to ten percent
during 1976 , with the oil sector alone growing by 14 . 8 percent .
Agricultural production increased during 1976 by three percent ,
a figure which while it may appear low, is a positive sign . when
one considers the agricultural growth rate of only one percent
recorded during 197 5 ·

Investments in machinery and transportation

grew by five percent during the 1976 period and · by 32 . 8 percent in
constrµction.

However, imports alone grew by 38 percent during

that same year while exports rose by only 30 percent .

As a re

sult of the latter figures , import restrictions wer e · imposed by
the federal government with a number of items being banned from
· being imported , including beer bott les , galvani zed buckets , spa
water , carbon paper, lace , and all cars over 2500 cc .

Still

a

trade surplus was recorded in 19?6 of 1 . 57 billion naira with
total exports of 6 7 1 billion naira and imports of 5 . 14 billion.
•.
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Aga. .in the predominance of petroleum products as an export earner
is i llustrated by the fact that they accounted for 6 . 281 billion
naira out of the 6 . 71 billion total . (Africa Research Bulletin .
1977

•

P·

4236 )

•

· 1n more specific terms . increases in certain areas of production were realized during the first years of the plan as are
'

i llustrated by the following tables a
Table VI--Nigerian Cocoa Production, 1975�1978 { thousands
of tons ) s
( 1 ) 1975-1976

215 . 0

( 2 ) 19?6-1977

165 . 0

( 3 ) 1977-1978

210 . 0 (Africa Research Bulletin. 1978 .

p . 4681-1+684 ) .
While production in this area did actually decline du�ing
these years . the relative stability enjoyed in cocoa production
and · the trend which Nigerian economists have pro jected for the
1980s seems t o have · created an air of optimism concerning this
primary commodity .

'Table VII--Nigerian Cement Production, 1973· · 197Z ( t ons ) t
Year

Imports

Domestic Output

Total

1973

868 , 766

1 . 242 , 674

2 , 110 . 440

1974

1 � 953 . 960

1 . 24 5 , 739

3 , 199 , 697

197 5

1 , 76 5 , 982

1 , 38 3 , 504

3 , 149. 486

1976

1 , 988 , 2 19

1 , 273 , 504

3 , 26 1 , 723

1977

4 , 747 , 388

1 , 439 , 793

6 , 187 , 181 (Afri2a
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Research Bulletin, 1978 , p . 4291 ) .

�able VIII--Nigerian Coffee Production, 1976-1978 ( thous
ands of bags ) a
1976-1977

30 . 0

1977-1978

80. 0

1978-1979

7 5 . 0 ( e stimated ) . (Africa Research Bulletin,

'

1979 , P • 4958 ) .

By 197 9 , however , the hard data seemed t o indicate that per
haps the time for optimism had run its course as exports for
1978 had dropped by 2 0 . 5 percent to a total figure of 6 . 064 bil
lion naira While imports had jumped 1 5 . 8 percent to reach 8 . 2 1 1
billion for a deficit of 2 . 14 billion naira.

In contrast , during

1977 a net surplus in the balance of payments of 537 million
�

naira had been reali z e d .

Petroleum still dominated exports but

had dec lined somewhat t o a 89 percent share of total exports as
•

compared to the figure of 92 . 8 percent in 1977·

Agricultural

exports �ew only marginall:y· from 437 . 9 million naira in value
.

�

in 1977 t o 440 . 8 million in 197 8 , but at the same time the value
of imported f o odstuffs alone rose from 736 . 4 million naira in
,

· 1977 to 1 . 0 billion naira in 1978 , · with rice costs increasing
r

by 13 · 5 p� rcent during that year, and accounting for - 1 75 . 8 mil
lion naira of the imported food costs . (Africa Research Bulletin,
.

1979 , P • 5061 ) .
The -Oudget priorities of the federal government seemed to
�

.
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reflect a concern with fostering of domestic economic develop
ment as the data in the following tables indicates . a
Table IX--Nigerian Capital Expenditures, 1979- 1980 ( naira ) a
( 1 ) Agricultural Development

34 . 347 million;
831 , 010;

' ( 2 ) C ommunications
I

( 3 ) Defense
( 4 ) Economic Deve lopment
( 5 ) Education
( 6 ) National Science and Technical

520. 000 millioni
2 7 . 638 million· ; •
326. 076 million ;
3 3 . 032 million;

- Deve lopment
(Africa Research Bulletin, 1979 , p . 5061 ) .

The allocation of government spedning for the 1979-1980
period s imi larly reflects the priorities placed by the govern
ment in the area of deve lopment"
Table X--Nigerian Budgetary Allocations, 1978-1979 ( naira ) a
.

( l. ) Defense
( 2 ) Agricultural Development
( 3 ) Communicati ons
( 4 ) Education
( .5 ) Economic Development and

.597 · 8.57 million;
19 . 711 million s
380 , 5000 ;
779. 312 million;
� 7 · 714 millioni

Construction
( 6 ) National Science and Technical

3 0 . 450 million.

Development
( Africa Re search Bulletin, 1979 . p. 4646 ) .
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Observations of budgeting allocations do seem to illustrate
one pertinent fact concerning the priorities of the Nigerian gov
ernment--the predominance of defense within budgetary considera
tions .

This trend was first detected in 1977 and as the 1976

figures became known it was apparent that defense expenditures
were accounting for approximately 25 percent of the recurrent
spending and the Nigerian army, numbering 250 , 00 0 , is the largest
on the African continent and reflects , to a very large extent ,
the fact that it has been military men who have been running the
government since 197 0 .

The importance placed · on defense spending

is of concern especially when once considers the relative inef
ficiencies of defense-related industries in regenerating i�1comes
in the w�stern indus trialized nations , especially when compared
to non-defense related enterpris e s .

The multiplier effect when

applied to defense-related industries is not nearly has high as
when compared to non-defense dinsustries and so in effect the
placing of high priorities on defense spending means that. in
the long run , the Nigerian economy cannot real i_ze as full of a
potential than if the investments and budgetary priorities were
.
skewed in· another d irection.
When one observe s the other primary areas of capital ex
penditures and budget allocations it does . · appear as if the gov
ernment in Nigeria is finally realizing just where its major
deficiencies are in terms of economic development .

Both agri

culture and · education are rece iving significant inputs from thr
government in terms of capital investments and annual budget
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allocations and the development of science and te chnology as well
as other basic infrastructures are receiving higher priorities than
they have in the pas t .
5 . Major Areas of Concern During the 1975-1979 Period •
A . Overspending by the Government s
Perhaps the biggest problem inherited by the new
regime in 1975 was the tendency towards overspending exhibited
by General Gowon based on his and his advisers overestimations
of the continuing importance of crude petroleum as a financier
of economic development for the foreseeable future .

By 1978 ,

as already noted , the federal government was forced to seek
$1 billion in loans from overseas , primarily from the British.
Efforts to secure loans from the French ran into early problems
due to the fact that in 197 5 . Nigeria ordered far too much ce
ment from international suppliers and then was forced to back
out of some of the contracts , resulting in legal actions being
direct�d against the government .

Eventually, the Nigerian govern

ment made a sett lement of $6 . 5 million, but even this did not
increase the faith which other suppliers had in the Nigerian
government or its economy. {The Economist , 197 8 , p . iJ? ) .
Government deflation efforts in 1978 reflected its growing
.

.

· concern and awareness of its overspending problem and almost
all companie s showed a fall in profits during the 1978 period .
In April of that year a severe budget was introduced by the
government as falling oil revenue , soaring imports , high infla-
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tion, and an excess growth of the money supply were all prevalent
and afflict ing the health of the Nigerian economy

•

.

Measures in

troduced by the government included a hefty credit squeeze and
tight exchange controls with imp�rters being asked to make ad
vance deppsits of often 100 percent on all consumer imports and
many import duties were �ncreased .
In addition, the imposition of the Import Prohibition Order
of 1978, banned the importing of a wide r�nge of items that could
be manufactured domestically inc luding fresh milk , beet sugar ,
pasta, be e r , footwear , carpets , furniture , jewelery, matche s ,
frozen meats , candles , eggs , clothing, cameras , electronic equip
ment , and spirits .

(The Economist, .19?8, p . ?8-79 ) .

B . Ethnic ity and Ec onomic Development •
The importance of ethnicity in the political devel
opment of the Nigerian nation has already been alluded to as well
as the ef·�gcts �thnicity and conflicts surrounding this concept
and applications of it can have on economic development as we l l .
Charles Nixon went even further in a study of cultural ties and
economic development and. discovered that where cultural groups
are adaptive to new situations and where new economic opportun
ities arise , cultural ties will be an important factor in select
ing individuals to fill the new economic roles and will thus
condition the manner ip which new economic classes are developed
within the society.

Specific examples cited are the communal

ties which shaped the deve lopment of cattle market ing in Ibadan
and the fact that credit was hand led through communual controls
not the court s .

Further: illustrating his contention was the fact
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that kola nuts were grown by Yorubas , but were bought , trans
ported , and di stributed by the Hausas (who also provided the
cattle for marketing and credits ) . ( Nixon, 1974, p . J9 ) .
Nixon also found from his research that major cultural groups
in Nigeria stand as rivals in both economic as we l l

as

political

spheres and each cultural group can be seen as consisting of a
full range of economic class differentials within its membe�
He also discovered that political leadership in each of

ship.

the major cultural groups reflected economic class position and
g3:ve the example of Dr

•

Azikiwe as being not only the political
.

leader of the Ibos , but also one of the most successful modern
entrepreneurs .

Also the wealthier cocoa farmers and traders in

the Western Region tended to join together with the traditional
Yoruba leaders t o provide political leadership. ( Nixon, 1974 , ·
P• 51) •
In terms of cu·1 tural representation within economic enterprises. , John Harris discovered that the Edo , Yoruba , and Ibo
groups were overrepresented in entrepreneurial activities , while
Ibib o , Efic , I jaw, Hausa-Fulani , and other groups were under
re-presented .

(Harris , 1970 , p . J01-J04 ) .

This underre·pi:-esentation

by s ome groups at the expense of others in entrepreneurial ac�ivi ties is s ignificant when one considers the degree of uneven
economic development Which can and in the pas has resulted be
tween the various regions within Nigeria because of the specific
occupational orientations within those different regions.

Harris

furttreT contends that entrepreneurial mobility is affected by
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ethnic identification as the lack of geographical mobility be
tween regions is striking and the inter-provincial �obility is
similarly limited .

While entrepreneurial activity has been a

s ource of upward mobility in many instances , intergenerational
and individual occupational mobility is also limited as is status
mobility by ethnic identifications . (Harris , 1970, P • 30� ) .
c.

· Economic Development and Community Developments
One part icular area in which the federal government

appears to have erroneously tried to revise the traditional eco
nomic method of production is within the Ibo communities of the
East Central State .

The Ibos of that region have long been

highly reputed for their community development efforts which are
initiated and implemented through voluntary organizations called
at various time s . deve lopment· unions , improved unions , town unions .
or age grade s , and these pro jects are unde rtaken without any
direct governmerit backing.
However , in spite of the past successes within the �bo de
ve lopment pro jects , the East Central government still felt it
necessary, with support from the federal government , t o enact the
Development Administration Edict of 1971 , which established com
munities as the fundamental administrative units in place of the
previously utilized country organizational apparatus .

Councils

were created at levels where democratic processes in W e stern tra
ditions are established with the ultimate goal of reducing to a
minimum the prevailing local rivalries and. tensions ( something
that still prevails in even the most politically-developed Western

political systems ) .

Another aim of the Edict was t o fully uti l i z e

local resources and allow the local people to effective control
their own affairs .

(Harris , 1979, p. 305 ) .

It soon became apparent that there were serious structural
deficiencies in the proposed and . implemented governmental pro
grams .

Due to the placing of councils in indigenous areas the

selections of council members are often based not on elective
method s , and indigenous and traditional ideas pervade the d e 
cis ion making proce sse s .

The decentralization tendencies of

the program are carried out to the point where 6�0 councils are
presently doing the same work that 105 county ones did previously
and over 200 of the newly established counce i ls have individual
jurisdictions of only 200 residents with the result that most
of the councils are too small and lack the vitality to perform
the broad range of functions assigned to them. Also , many of the
powers given t o the councils were previously performed by cul
tural unions , which naturally resent the usurption of their powers .
Under the cultural union system, wealth, and often more capable ,
individuals considered it an honor to . serve , and the org�nizations
as a . result were more respe cted , while under the council system,
corrupt ion in the se lection process prevails and partisanship
rather than profes s ionalism dominate s the planning and implemen
tation proces se s . (Ez e , 1976 , P• 155 ) .
Financial problems have also been encountered under the
new council plan as the raising of revenue is made difficult
by the fact that 77 . 5 -Percent of all revenues a� . defrived from
,,

.

-
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sources which are easily evad e d .

-

License fees are being con

t inuously reduced as a percentage of financing due to poor col
lection techniques and evasion is rampant .

Expenditure problems

are also enoucntered due to the fact that the councils are too
small to handle the s i z e of many· of the projects as their work
loads are much more burdensome than those of the counties and
\

cultural unions had been, yet the counc ils are much smaller administrative units .

( E z e , 1976 , p . 157-161 ) .

D · The Prevalence of Tax Evasions s
One of the major problems facing the federal and state
governments is in the area of revenue collection due to the pre
valence of tax evasions by Nigerians engaged in commercial ac
tivit ies .

An

individual may arrange a business venture in such

a way that details of it may not be ascertainable for proper
assessment .

Further, the assessment authorities base taxes only

on declared assets and incomes and tax assessment and collection
has been deplorable in the pas t , and it is only in the Northern
states that authorities have been able to manage efficient asses
sment and collection procedures

•

. · pers onal income taxes have never constituted a significant
proportion of total government revenue as 50 percent of Nigerian
revenues in the past have been derived from indirect taxe s , taxes
which are considerably more regressive in nature .

Companies also

benefit from the tax system as profits taxation allows very gen
erous deductions before taxable income is determined , yet as has
.

'

already been discussed , increases in industrialization efforts'
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by indigenous entrepreneurs is not proceeding at the pace anti
cipated or desired by the government .

( Ogbonna , 1975. p . 54-57 ) .

E . · Manpower Needs and Educational Development s
Nigeria ' s manpower situation is presumed to be so crucial to the economic future that it is commonly be lieved that
shortages of skilled labor , rather than investment capital or
foreign exchange would be the most likely hindrance to Nig�rian
e c onomic deve lopment over the long range .

Typically, analysts

have prescribed solutions to these shortages which are · in the best
traditions of libera l , generally Western, economic-oriented , and
capitalist theories of economic development .

There has in the

past been an assumption that a virtual automatic correlation
exists between a society' s level of formal education and its level
of economic growth and development as well as the belief that the·
correct mix of formal educat ion is necessary to ensure the pro
per proportion of different graduates which the nation' s devel- �
opment�l policies require .

(Anosike , 197 7 . p . 27-29 ) .

Orthodox Western manpower the ory regards the development of
human capital as the principle source of every nation' s deve1.

.

.

opment and in . fact replaces the emphasis on net investment of capital with human investments .

The educational component of the

· labor force is seen as a partner in the production process and
that the link betwee n the production of physical goods and ser
vices and the educat ional system is productivity itself.

In the

the application· of these Western orientations to Nigerian edu�
cational theory and actual practi c e , one dis covers that formal
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education has become the principle avenue for transmitting tech
nical and general capability skills to the nation' s labor force .
However , sizable unemployment prevails among the educated elites
primarily because of the imbalance between the educational struc
tures and the real needs of the c ountry. (Anosike , 19? ? , p. 30 ) .
The contributi ons of formal education t o development may
be generally summarized as the following major benefits s
( 1 ) An increase in the skill-learning potential ( but
formal · education may not perform a vital role in
the upgrading of productive skills ) i
( 2 ) Over an individual ' s lifetime , formal education has
a

greater rate of economic return than e ither on

the-job training or adult education programs :
( 3 ) Education influences occupational attainment and
income .

(Anosike , 1977, P · 3 1 ) .

However , formal education is not a panacea t o cure all of
the manpower shortages facing Nigeri a .

For instanc e , education

may not increase productivity as is evident from observing the
increasing educational levels of Western industrialized nations
-

at the same time th�t their productivity among workers is levelling
off or even declining.

Als o , while the skill levels demanded by

Nigeria . have increased , in contrast to the industrialized world ,
large numbers of low-skill level jobs exist in developing coun
tries and the skill levels demanded by specific industries may
in many instances be inappropriate to the real labor needs for a
particular industry (the emphasis on " over-education" which . is so

prevalent in Western societies ) . (Anosike , 197 7 . P • 32-33 ) .
There have been several consequences which have resulted
from Nigeria ' s emulation of Western educational systems and they
include all of the following :
( 1 ) The educational system has been put unde r and in
tolerable strain and has shown s igns of beginning
to break downr

•

( 2 ) The d emand for teachers has become the single big
gest factor in determining the size of higher ed
ucation, and about one-half of all graduates from
Nigerian universities become teachers ( a role which
in the short-run adds very little to real levels of
economic productivity ) r
( J ) The fiscal burden of establishing an educational
infrastructure is enormous i
( 4 ) White collar unemployment continues t o accelerate i
( 5 ) On-the-job training and other informal procedures
of upgrading already ·e mployed workers. are neglected i
( 6 ) A serious "brain-drain" and :foreigil emigration of
the oyer-educated but indigenous elites continues :
( 7 ) Skills are o:ften produced in advance of real needs .
(Anosike , 197 7 . p . 41-42 ) .
In 197 7 . a White Paper was issued entitled a.s the " National
Policy on Education" and within it there was established national
objectives for the education of all the citizenry as one method
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of ensuring national integration and education was seen aslo as
being the most fundamental instrument of change , political, so
cial, and economic . ( Again reflecting Lipset ' s contentions of the
correlati ons between educational levels and economic and political
development ) .

Concern with agricultural productivity was also

reflected in the Paper with stipulations that educational systems
must participate in agriculture and a percentage of educat�on
finances were devoted to technology and science with the opening
of more colleges of technology and polytechni c s .

Educational

institutions were also established for gifted children and all
children, including those with phys ical, mental , and learning
difficult ie s , are provided for within the educational system.
A need was also recognized for intensifying and diversifying
university programming for the deve lopment of a higher level of
manpower for the needs of the e conomy and local industries were
encouraged to develop direct links with research institutions
�nd Ur.iversiti e s . (West Africa , 1978, p . 1882-1883 ) .
The Nigerian government has also launched a massive pro
gram of sending students overseas , particularly t o the United
.
States and Great Britain in order to make up for the crucial
>

shortages in administrative , manageria l , and engineering pos
itions which were discussed earlier.

During the 1976-1977 per

iod , 1 1 , 870 Nigerian students were enrolled in instutions of
higher education in the United States alone .

The government

hopes that it can fill its manpower shortages , at least during
the short -run ·through the exporting of these students t o attain
Western educations . (Higher Education Daily , 1978 , p . J ) .

F . The Future of Agricultural neve lopment a
Nigeria ' s pro jected food deficits for the near future
almost equals that of India, with production increasing only . 5
percent annually while the population increases at a 3 . 0 percent
age rat e .

Production needs to grow at a 4 . 8 to 5 . 5 percentage

annual rate to meet the 1990 population and consumption pro jec'

tions .

In 197 5 , agricultural production amounted t o 18 , 741 metric

tons while consumption was 2 8 , 763 metric tons .

By 199 0 , pro

duction will have risen (if present trends continue ) to only
1 9 , 304 metric tons while consumption will be anywheres from J J , 928
metric tons (under conditions meeting 110 percent of energy re 
quirements ) , t o 39 , 835 metric tons ( under rapid economic growth
pro jections ) .

There' is also a need to increase the production of

cereals because historically, as per capita incomes rise in de
veloping nat ions the tendency i s generally that consumption pre
ferences 1witch from root crops to grains and grain-fed beef ,
both areas current ly experiencing dec lines in Nigerian agricul
tural production. (Food Needs Of Developing Countries a Projections ,
of Production and Consumpt i on to 1990 , 1977 . P • 19 ) .
The fact that many of the land holdings of the peasants are
relatively �mall has already been discussed , but another factor
that serves as an impediment to increasing agricultural production
is the prevalence of communal hold ings in certain regi ons of Ni 
geria .

The communal holding is a traditional method �f land

tenure in Nigeria in whieh the co�unity poss esses the land in
perpetuity and individuals re siding in the community ( d etermined
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by traditional ethnic identifications ) , are entitled to farm
land appropriated for their individual use .

In fact , the prac

tice of se lling land was unknown in Nigeria until 1852 , and its
practice was halted in We stern Nigeria in 1913 because it was
feared it was destroying the communal system. ( Ike , 1977, p . 189 ) .
In comparing the pr9ductivity of the communal system of land
tenur and the freeholder system, one finds that the average in
c�me and average income per cultivated acre was larger for the
freeholder ( $1 , 072 versus $780 in annual income and $60 versus
$45 per acre ) .

Also it is evident that the freeholder culti

vates a greater proportion of the land that under the communal
system ( 6 3 percent versus 51 percent ) and this is very important
in a nation which has only JO percent of its arable land under
cultivation. ( Ike , 197 7 , P • 19) ) .
One last area under the present system of agriculture needs
to be di ·. cussed because of its negative effe cts on attempts t o
raise productivity levels , and that i s the propensity fvr Ni
gerian farmers , whether under the freeholder or communal systems ,
towards multiple-cropping as opposed t o a concentration on sin.

gle-cropping.

.

Studies have shown that the preferences of Ni

gerians is to use multiple-cropping as a hedge agains market
fluctuations affecting one ·crop and the fact that land holdings
in Nigeria are so small and peasants are often engaged in sub
sistence farming, requiring a variety of crops .

Agricultural

information concerning increasing productivity seems to indicate
that movements t owards higher concentrations of hold ings and the
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specialization accompanying single-croppings in the long-run
are more beneficial for improving the con�ributions of the ag
ricultural sector of the community towards overall national
economic development .
Two major strategies are recommended for Nigerian rural
development in the late 1970s and the early 1980s for fostering
agricultural development by 1985 : the expansion of exports of
agricultural products and the creation of lead time to feed the
masses by investing in research and development programs .

Three

specific policies are seen as necessary to implement these two
strategies :
( 1 ) The provision to farmers of more fa�orable incen

tives through reducing taxes on producers ;
( 2 ) Granting of short-run subs idies to farmers who
produce high pay-off crops and the establishment
of productivity campaigns ;
( 3 ) The privision of infrastructural support , including
rrsearch, extension credit , and other supporting
services for both strategies .

(Eicher and Johns on ,

19? 0 , p . 385 ) .

4 . Summary of the Third Development Plan, 1975-198 0 1
The four years since the implementation of the third
economic development plan have been years of both highs and lows
for the Nigerian economy.

Positive trends have been detected

including the constructing of an expansive iron and steel pro ject
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in Kwara State which is expected to cost a a minimum 20 million
naira ( including geological explorations and the e stablishment
of metallurgical laboratories ) under the auspices of Soviet-

.

trained members of the Nigerian Steel Development Authority is
just one example of efforts an industrializ ing the economy: ·

Ni

geria presently imports + · 5 million tons of steel a year but by
1981 the Kwara pro ject will be able to produce . 5 million tons

of steel products annually and thus save the Nigerian economy some
400 million naira a year in foreign exchange . (West Africa, 197 7 ,

p � 1963 ) .
It also appears as if the true value of petroleum and its
by-products is being reevaluated as the sole means necessary for
f inancing ec onomic deve lopment programs and import substitution
and indigenization programs are being aimed at the promotion of
a Nigerian indust�ial infrastructure .

The demand for money within

the economy is stable , though control over the money supply is
difficult to maintain through open market operations since large
interest rate changes are not feasible due to external restraints
.{bai,ance of payment problems ) and domestic requirements ( govern- .
ment financing pro jects ) . ( A jayi , 1977 , p . 54 ) .

Still it appears

that inflation is finally being taken serious ly , and e fforts over
the · past few years have reduced its annual rate considerably.
Serious problems do remain , particularly in the area of
transportation infrastructures .

In genera l , the Nigerian trans

portation system is characterized by �oor coord ination , misin
vestments , operational deficit s , a lack 00f maintenance , an in-
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adequage utilization of human and natural resource s , and poor
management and operational control . ( Nwosu, 197 7 , p . 2 4 ) .
In 1970, only J 0 , 000 miles of roads out of a total of 5 5 , 000
were paved and those roads being used pre sently are being abused
by heavy truck and bus traffic .

' The national rai lway system was

established in 1898 but has operated in a deficit since 196 9 .
The freight liftings of the train network have substantially
d e c lined from 850, 000 tons in 1958-1959 t o 350 ,�oo tons in
1910-1971 and the operations further have' deteriorated between
1971 and 197*·

The track system was constructed between 1898 and

1965 and much of it is now obs olete and does not even have a

standard size guage .

The 2 , 178 miles of track are characterized

by extensive track curvature , lightweight rail s , weak bridges ,
steep grades , and obsolete signalling systems .

Defects in the

diesel engine s , heavy backlogs in maintenance and repair wor� ,
extensive detention times at stations , poor passenger facilities ,
and a poor communication system further aggravates the effective
ness of the national rail network .

( Nwosu, 1977 , p . 26 ) .

Port faci lities in light of the o i l boom, have proven t o
be wh�lly inadequate , though several ·new berthing operatings
have been under construction and some have now been completed .
Port de lays in 1975 were five to six weeks and imposed staggering
difficulties on importers , exporters , and dom�stic customers
alike .

The Nigerian Airways was established in 1959 and has a

nonopoly on all domestic air traffic , yet , because of management
. .

problems the corporation has yet t o realize a profit on its do-
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mestic business , and service is not dependable as flight sched
uli'ng and waiting times are unpredictable .

Deficiencies are

also apparent in areas of engineering , maintenance , communications .
eq�ipment , accommodations and support faci lities . ( Nwosu, 1977,
P•

29-32 )

•

Another major problem inherent in the implementation of the
'

1975-1980 economic deve lopme.nt program is the prevalence of
corruption within all levels of governmel'.lt ·

·

In 1975 alone ,

11 , 000 public employe es were dismissed because of corrupt prac
tices and ten out of twelve governors under Gowon' s regime were
subsequently found guilty of appropriating $16 million for their
own private use . ( Nwosu, 1977, p. 34 ) .
Richard Joseph does an analysis of the progre ss made under
the 1975-1980 national economic development plan in a June , 1978
issue of The Journal of Modern African Stud ies , particularly in
the area �f industrial deve lopment .

He finds little real pro

gress has been made because all power plants , military hardware ,
transport machinery ,_ railroad equipment , iron and steel products
( t o be domestically produced in part by 198 1 ) , e lectrical and
electronic goods , and many other manufactured goods are still
being imported .

These goods are in many instances too essential

to the maintenance and development of the economy to be taxed at
a much higher rate and dome stic entrepreneurs are often hesitant
t o attempt t o establish indigenous enterprise s . ( Joseph, 1978 ,
p . 225 ) .
Joseph further sees little hope for the solving of these
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imbalances in the near future , as the basic engineering sub-sector
for the production of machinery ,equipment and capital goods ac
c ounts for less than three percent of all value-adde d , and the
basic metal industry for only 1 . 5 percent , while 50 p��cent is
provided in manufacturing ( primarily from food , beverages , to
bacc o , textiles , and clothing ) .

He believes that Nigeria lacks

'

an effectiv: agency of industrialization and also finds indigenous entrepreneurs interested only in quick returns such as are
d�rived from traditional trading activities and generally reluc
tant to invest in industrial enterpris e s .

Many of the traditional

values associated with an emergent capitalist class are absent
among the Nigerian peoples and in place of austerity and dedication , . one often finds extravagant consumption and the " group
of companies'' mentality instead of individual initiative and
enterpris e . ( Joseph, 1978 , p . 226-227 ) .

v.

Conclusions a
1 . Economic Development During the 1970� 1
The major orientation of this paper was to .explore tha

economic development of the nation of Nigeria during the ' decade
of the 1970s .

Gutland and Wallerstein ' s concept of political

economy was utilized in explaining the prevalence of conditions
of underdevelopment found within Nigeria after the granting of
independence in 1960.

The myths perpetuated by Euro-centric

historians , political scientist s , and economists who denied the
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eKistence of political or economic development in the African
c ontinent were refuted as definite instance s of both economic
and politibal development were cited in the Nigerian study.

The

far-reaching effects of the imposed colonial system on the economic
and political development of the Nigerian nation were also ex
plored as well as the ramifications these effects were to have
'

once independence was realiz e d .
The specific problems facing the economic development of
Nigeria at the onset of its first major development program were
touched upon as were the political events preced ing the Biafran
War and the regional and ethnic diversities which touched off
that war and have affecyed the political and economic developmental efforts throughout its history, pre -colonial, colonial , ·
and post-colonial eras all included .

Finally, the paper concen

trated its analysi s on the efforts at economic development
as political stability was achieved in the 1970s .

Throughout

the entire paper the concern expressed with the economic de
velopment of Nigeria was explained in the theories of such
stholars of development as S eymour Llpset who contend that a
correlation exists between levels of economic deve lopment and
subsequent efforts at the promot i on of political development .
The conclusions reached connerning the future of economic
devel opment in Nigeria are centered around the belief that the
nation still possesses the potentials to become the leading Af
rican nation during the decade of the 1980s .

It has a relative

abundance of natural and human re s ources and petroleum supplies
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ample enough , if carefully exploited along with serious efforts
at the promotions of industrialization and agriculture , to fi
nance the deve lopment programs of the government in the 1980s .
However, serious problems remain t o be solved--the stagnation of
agricultural production means that the nation pays a staggering
import bill of one billion dollars annually just for food pro
ducts which could be produced dome stically.

Only 30 percent of

the arable land i s currently under cultivation, but rural areas
are facing labor shortages due to migratory trends to urban areas
and agricu�tural te chnology remains backward and productivity
re latively inefficient due to s tructural deficiencies ( the frag
mentation of land holdings due to the prevalence of communal and
peasant farming methods as well as the prevalence of multiple
cropping ) and at times agricultural production has even been
unre sponsive to the market incentives , both domestically and
internationally.
Serious problems also exis"t in the shortages of high level
administrative and managerial personne l as well as in technical
posit ions .

The nat ion ' s large proportion o� the population under

the ' age of sixteen means an /jnqrmous investment in an educational
infrastructure must be spen� with corresponding increases in pro
ductivity not to be realized in the short-run.

A total lack of

emphasis on informal training is also evident and s o no present
system exists for the upgrading of already employed workers.
Important areas of the nation ' s transportation infrastruc
ture also need to be constructed and/or upgrade d .

The fact that
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the major transportation systems are nationalized b.ut. still have
yet to realized any profit in their operations means that per
haps s ome alternative ownership and/or management s ystems need to
be considered .

Economic development depends on the early devel

opment of an efficient transportation system as the Britishfinanced national railroad system in the United Stat�s was what
'

made possible ·the opening up . of the We stern frontiers and the
exploitatipn of the resources necessary for subsequent indus
trialization.
Positive signs are pre sent , specifically the stability of
the demand for money, and the fact that the government has come
t o recognize many of the areas needing special attent i on , such
as the .promotion of agriculture , controlling of inflati on , and
the curbing of wasteful import spending, all seem to indicate
that as Nigeria nears the end of military rule and returns t o
a democratic political proce ss , the hopes for a stable and s ound
ec onomic system. (which Lipset and others would contend is ne
ces sary in order to maintain a democratic form of government )
in the future is a very attainable goal and depends to a large
extent on the decisions made in the . future as specific problems
are encountered , analyzed , and possible soluti ons proposed .
e.

The Military as Agents of Economic Developmen� z
A second orientation of this paper was an evaluation of

the military regimes in the 1970s as agents of development within
the Nigerian context .
.

.

McKinlay and Cohan ' s surveys of military
.

and nonmilitary regimes throughout the developing world over

-86-

the past twenty years seemed to indicate that one could expect
neither s ignficantly higher levels of economic development under
a military regime or s ignificantly lower levels , although some of
their findings did seem to indicate that military regimes exper
ienced l&ss success in the international trading system.

However ,

i n the Nigerian case-study, the fact that the nation possesses
.
such a valuable primary commod ity as petroleum at a time in the
'

history of the world when that commodity is in . high demand and
diminishing supplies , seems to have offset any negative encounters
by the Nigerian military regime in international trade .
If we are to once again refer to the goals of any political
system as described earlier within the guidelines p11t forth by
Potholm , then this is one method of evaluat.ing the overall suecess of the mil itary regimes in Nigeria during the 1970s .

The

survival of the Nigerian political-economic system has definitely
been realized as the ending of the Civil War marked the conclusion
of s ignificant and overt conflicts between the ma j or regions and
ethnic groupings and no significant uprisings have occurred in
the interim peri od .

The goal of freedom, as mentioned previous ly,

as become · a re lative concept in · today ' s interdependent political
and economic systems and particularly so for the developing na
tions o.f the world , who must depend on essential inputs and as
s istance from the industrialized world in order to realize their
own developmental scheme s .

Nigeria has been fortunate to have

possessed ample petroleum reserves and this has enabled the nation
some degree of leverage in international affairs , and more par-
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ticularly, in sub-Saharan African affairs .
Stability , political , and ec onomic development are also goals
of the political system as described by Potholm .

Stability has

definitely been achieved within Nigeria and ·the economic data
.
seems to indicate that with careful planning the continued eco
nomic development of the nation should continue throughout the
· 1980s .

With the return to a democratic form of government in

September, 1979 , it would also appear that some degree of pol
itical development has also been realized .

For those who doubt

the sincerity of the military ' s commitment towards relinquishing
political control , the information supplied by Bienen seems to
indicate that the military, since 196 7 , has been making a conscious effort to incorporate civilians in all levels of govern
ment and in decision making positions as we l l as merely admin
istrative one s .
Bienen went further in his surveys and conducted polls ,
although they were limited to the Western Region, concerning the
opinions of the general populace regarding the efforts of the
military in the areas of economic and political development .

In-

'

terest ingly enough , the resul.ts seem" to indicate that the majority of those surveyed felt that the mi litary government in
Nigeria was no more successful at the promoting of economic
development or political stability with the opinions of many
individuals that the military itself di splayed as much internal
instability as had pervious civilan regime s .
p . 220 ) .

( Bienen, 1978 ,
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International objectives of the Nigerian nation have been
achieved to a certain extent , particularly as concerns its in
volvements in sub-Saharan issue s .

With the elecion of Jimmy

Carter in the United States in 1976 , the relati ons between Nigeria and the Americans have improved and the Western world as
a whole has come to accept the nation as one of the most serious
'

spokesmen for the African continent .
The abilities of the military regimes to exploit the re
sources of the nation have been questionable , although once again
there can be no doupt that s ome progress has been achieved .

In

terms of its regulative capacity , the government has maintained
order during its interim rule and has for the most part been ac
cepted as a temporary legitimate governing. pody, although this
acceptance has always been contingent on the promises of the
eventual return to a civilian form of government.
The extractive capability of the military has not been ut
ilized to the best possible extent as figures regarding production
(both industrial as well as agricultural ) seem to indicate that
the military has not been particularly innovative as concerns the
promotion of development in those specific ' areas .

Serious pro

blems remain unsolved in the area of transportation infrastruc
. ture s , although it does appear that the mil itary has finally re
alized the specific deficiencies and has in the past few years
devoted more investment capital in those areas .
An attempt at the equal distribution of the benefits of
industrialization appears to have been seriously undertaken with

-

�9

-

the policies of import substituion and Nigeriani zation and the
limits placed on individual ownership by Nigerians .

Also by

making access to education open to all Nigerians the government
is pursuing what it believes is the best opportunity to ensure
an equal opportunity and equal success of social mobility for
all Nigerian s .

Yet ethnicity prevails in both the political

and economic systems ana remains a impediment to mobility be
tween regions and also still places constraints on upward mo
bility within ethnic groupings .
In terms of its re juven�tive capicity , it does appear that
the military government has constantly readjusted its policies
and priorities to correspond with the real needs and the real
capabilities of the Nigerian economic system.

The symbolic ca

pability of the in the eyes of the world community has been for
the most part a positive expre ssion , again due in part to the
valuable petroleum reserves which that nation possesses .
. In his conclusions from studying military regimes , Potholm
has determined that the military offers a system of rule which
i s no more stable than civilian regimes , there is no less evi
dence of corruption in military government s , in general there
is a lack of success in the promotion of economic deve lopment , and
while the origin and style of the e lites has differe d , the out
puts in general have . not , again reaffirming to a certain extent ,
the findings of McKinlay and Cohan.

The success of the Nigerian

military regime has been due largely to the nature of the mili
tary intervention in domestic politic s .

The military became
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involved in the dome stic politics only when the total collapse
of the nation was threatene d . and from the onset of their takeover they never intended for their rule to be more than an in
terim one , until political and ec onomic stability could be achieved .
3 . Has Political Development Occurred in the 19ZOs i
As a paper written by a political scientist , the major
'

concern with the success or failure of the economic policies of
the military regimes in Nigeria during the 1970s should be dir
ectly related t o whether or not comparable political develop
ment has also taken place .

The return to a democratic form of

government in September, 1979 , seems to indicate that indeed
political development , if we are to use the guidelines set forth
by We lch and others , has indeed been accompan¥ing the economic
development of the Nigerian nat ion.

However , many are still

doubtful due to the fact that similar promises of a return of
the mil itary to the barracks have in the past been reneged upon
throughout the aeveloping world .

However, the data supplied by

Bienen which indicates that a definite effort has been undertaken
t o incorporate civi lians into responsible governmental positions
since 196 7 , indicates that from the . onset of its rule , the mili
tary has attempted to prepare for an eventual resumption of a
civilian form of government .
Bienen also found from his studies that the African military
is le ss insulated from the rest of society than are military re
gimes in other developing countri es and that the profess ionaliza-

'

.

tion of African military organizati ons is not as high as those of
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other nat ions . ( Bienen, 1978. p. 207 ) .

The fact that the Ni

gerian army is the largest in terms of numbers within the African
continent and the fact that Nigerian budgets allocate a dispro
��rtionate share of investments to the military. would seem to
detract from some of Bienen' s conclusions regarding ·the propen
sity for the military to re linquish control to civilians in the
\

S e ptember , 19?9 . elections .

However , further informat ion sup

plied by McKinlay and Cohan indicates that the resource level of
a military organization does not appear to influence the degree
of civilianization and military regimes with larger and more
expensive armies do not resist civilianization to any greater of
an extent than do those regimes less endowe d . (McKinlay and Co
han, 19?6 , p . 300 ) .
In condluding , it does appear that definite strides towards
the e c onomic deve lopment of the Ni gerian nation have ta.ken place
during tPe 1970s.

If one is to accept Lipset ' s contention that

political deve lopment and economic development are stro�gly cor
related , and if one accepts the findings of Bienen, McKinlay,
and Cohan , then it also appears that definite progress towards
political development has also occurred within the nation of Nigeria.

\

Serious problems do remain , both economic in terms of

declining agricu·ltural product ion, and political in terms of the
prevalence of ethnicity in political and economic areas .

The ef

forts of the military to expose the ethnic groups to additional
cross-pressures by subdividing . the nation into nineteen states
and the promoting of equal access to education appear to be aimed
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at reducing the potentials for ethnic conflicts within the pol
itcal arena once a return to civilian government takes plac e .
Whether or not t e n years has been a long enough time t o erase
centu�ies of ethnic rivalries remains a serious question, and
only by observing the political developments within Nigeria after
the September e le c t i ons take place can one effectively attempt ·

to evaluate the role of the military regimes during the 1970s
in the promotion of political as well as ec onomic development .

-
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